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–––––––- “Giving a fish to the poor man, you will feed him for one day; teaching –––––– 
him the way of fishing,you will help him for his whole life.“
(Chinese saying)
--------- ”Market and property are the crucial attribute for the subisidiarity,--------  
real charity and social rules.” 
 (Rev. Robert Sirico)
–––––––-”A society, where the individual effort to generate as much values as possible ––––– 
 is replaced by the all-knowing tutor state, becomes soon a pauperized society of spongers.“
(Nils Karleby)
–––––-„The statesman who would attempt to direct private people in what manner ––––-  
they ought to employ their capitals, would... assume an authority, which could safely be trusted to no 
council and senate whatever, and which nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had 
folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.“
(Adam Smith)
––––––”The relying on solidarity, love or social spirit as a mechanism –––––
for social co-ordination can be applied only in small open societies; this feeling loses as soon as the 
growing society dimensions start to separate the individuals form each other.“
(F. A. Hayek, [944] 00)
 
 
1 rojas (2001), p. 15.     
2 Hayek (�1�44�� 2001), p. 62.     
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Introduction
The social system in slovakia, as well as, more or less, the social systems in other countries, is one of 
the crucial sources of important ethical, economic and social problems. We agree with nils karleby’s, 
quotation that „A society, where the individual effort to generate as much values as possible is replaced 
by the all-knowing tutor state, becomes soon a pauperized society of spongers.“3 
also in slovakia, there persists the long-term impact of such system distortions as the „culture of de-
pendency“ on social benefits and other ways of the government „support“ of an important part of the 
population, the passivity of many people and their relying on others (mainly on the government) and 
low weigh of voluntary solidarity and private activities (not only) in the social sphere. another after-
math of the system distortions is related thereto: high costs of the social system sustainment. These 
costs cause significant financial burden for the economic entities by the mean of tax and, first of all, 
social contributions; they restrict the employment incentives (for both employers and employees) and 
thereby constitute a significant obstacle for the business development and solution of unemployment, 
mainly the long-term unemployment. 
it is just the long-term unemployment and, most of all, the poverty, which are the most visible part 
of the system problems in social affairs. They both not only make unstable the financial situation of 
the people, but also impair their psychic integrity and the vitality in general. often, this leads toward 
asocial behavior of these people, which threaten the others, many times even with criminal acts4.  
in slovakia, the long-term unemployment problem remains significant despite the achieved gradual 
reduction of the total rate of unemployment. The percentage of long-term unemployed people in 
slovakia is the highest from among all oecD countries, when comparing both the ratio of long-term 
unemployed persons to all the people in economically active age as well as their ratio to the total 
number of unemployed persons (more than 50% of them are the long-term unemployed). The persons 
who are unemployed more than two years and poor constitute specific problem, although currently 
with no significant share in the population. They are concentrated mainly in roma settlements.
     
During the last two years, the slovak Government has implemented measures in social policy, which 
meant also unquestionable benefits.  for example, the social trap5 was reduced (by the ceiling of total 
benefit for the family) and certain pressure was generated on the activity of the welfare benefit recipi-
ents. However, the large and highly set level of mandatory social solidarity and its aftermaths (mainly 
the excessive burden on business entities, consisting of high social contributions and suppressed vol-
untary solidarity) remained (almost) unchanged. for example, large financial benefits without coun-
ter-value demand remained unchanged; moreover to that, some of these benefits are universal (e.g. the 
child allowance). various benefits are paid in cash; this often does not mean any solution to the poor 
person’s problem of income lack. This confirms that the government does not carry out systematic 
3 rojas (2001), p. 15.     
4 The riots in france during the fall in 2005 were an example of this affirmation. We are convinced that, among other causes, the com-                        
bination of too generous french social system and significant percentage of (relatively poor) immigrants from arabic and african 
countries triggered that violence. 
5 social trap (e.g. unemployment trap or poverty trap) means situation, when there are more incentives to remain (passive) in the                     
social system than to become employed or active in other manner. Most frequently, the difference between the income in the social 
system and relatively comparable earning in the labor market are compared. for simplification purposes, e.g., the average income 
within the social system is compared with the minimum wage.
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welfare reform with emphasis on long term and change of concept toward target-addressed social 
policy aimed to those who objectively need it. 
Our goal is to introduce welfare reform with such emphasis to the common public. We attempt to 
come with solution of system distortions in order to contribute in synergetic manner, throughout 
solutions for milestones (such as reduction of long-term unemployment), to the poverty reduction 
and protection against it for those who really cannot take care of themselves and their families (see 
chapter 4 for more details). With regard to the final perspective, we find only the emphasis on poverty 
issues as acceptable and legitimate for the social policy.  
This publication introduces, first of all, our concept for the solution of the long-term distortions en-
during in the social system. Therefore, we differentiate between the long-term perspective of achieving 
the desirable goal in the future and the milestones whose achieving might help to achieve the goal.   
The welfare reform draft given in Chapter 4 is based on the following subsequent and mutually inter-
connected cornerstones:
▶ value framework of the reform consisting in balance between market and ethics;
▶ definition of the government role in the society as the base for determination of level of mandatory 
social solidarity (section 1.1); 
▶ fundamental principles in social affairs (section 1.2);
▶ negative trends and distortions, which affected and affect in long term the definition of social policy 
worldwide, especially in european union (section 2.1);
▶ systematic problems and distortions of social system in slovakia (section 2.2);
▶ examples of reform steps in slovakia (section 3.1) and abroad, e.g. in new Zealand and some u.s. 
states (Wisconsin, new York, oregon and colorado) – see section 3.2.
The research trip of Peter Gonda and Michal novota to the u.s. in 2005, which was aimed to learn 
about successful welfare reforms, mainly in Wisconsin and colorado, contributed to the outcome of 
this publication significantly. We would like to express our gratitude to our hosts – Mr. Jason turner, 
Mr. Dick Wulf and Mrs. Jean Wulf, Ms. Maija schiedel and many other employees of el Paso county 
Department of Human services in colorado springs as well as to Mr. Bill Baker for the inter-media-
tion. 
our gratitude belongs also to all those who made comments and consultations with whom helped us 
to improve the text hereof. at last, but not at least, we thank our families for the understanding they 
gave us during the writing of this publication.      
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1. Conceptual Basis
The main conceptual bases hereof are the principles of classical liberal economics and conservatism. 
Therefore, the text hereof, including the proposed solutions of the main problems in social sphere in 
slovakia, is based on two pillars: market as the base of classical (economic) liberalism and ethics as the 
base of conservatism.  Worldwide renowned economists, as well as many philosophers6, and we believe 
that free market and ethics are compatible, complementary and can balance each other. a degree, to 
which this really happens in the society, depends on the resulting effect of the individual human deci-
sions. However, we consider the equilibrium of market and ethics (as shown in Diagram ), or practical 
status as close as possible to this equilibrium, to be crucial condition for a successful community in 
long term: in both economic and non-economic aspects.   
Diagram  
Equilibrium of Market and Ethics
Source: Gonda (2005a), authors.
We have followed from the classical economic liberalism (developed mainly by adam smith and alexis 
de tocqueville) and conservatism (mainly in accordance with the heritage of edmund Burke), which 
similarly (although not identically) emphasize the following: 
1. human individuality with personal freedom and market with its invisible hand, with spontaneous 
order and voluntary relations7 as well as 
2.	human imperfection and restrictions and the risks arising thereof in case of power concentration. 
This requires, (also) for the purposes of welfare reform in slovakia, the value-based limits, mainly the 
limits of individual freedom and freedom of choice. since we honor the traditions and evolutionary 
development, we find as their best guarantees the following:
▶ christian faith, mainly The ten commandments and another generally accepted social rules in 
public;
6 for example, in the work of adam smith (        http://www.lucidcafe.com/library/�6jun/smith.html#books), Milton friedman (http://www.
ideachannel.com/friedman.htm, http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/bios/friedman.html), friedrich augustus von Hayek (http://cepa.
newschool.edu/het/profiles/hayek.htm), Michael novak (http://www.aei.org/scholars/scholariD.44,filter.all/scholar.asp) and charles 
Murray. (http://www.aei.org/scholars/scholariD.43/scholar.asp).
7 for example, smith (�1776�� 1��3) and Hayek (�1�44�� 2001).        
MARKET
= individual 
(economic) freedom 
= unlimited competition 
and free pricing
= no government control  
of business activities
= maximizing of benefits 
ETHICS
= individual  
responsibility
= universal truth  
and respect thereof
= „rule of law“, mainly the  
protection of property rights
= voluntary solidarity
0
Draft of Welfare Reform in Slovakia
▶ legislative rules (“rule of law“), aimed mainly to the protection of life and property (property 
rights);8
▶	limited government.�
1.1 Government Role in Society Based on Market Economy10
The interconnection between the most largely defined conceptual basis and pillars of the society (market 
and ethics) and the principles of social sphere (to be described hereunder) is just the limited government, 
its theoretical framework definition as well as the specification of practical execution of its tasks.  
our determination of the government tasks in the society is based on the ideas of “spiritual father“ of 
the classical  liberal economics, adam smith, conservative philosopher roger scruton and the laure-
ates of the nobel Prize in economics James M. Buchanan and ronald coase. in simplified manner, 
their following congruence shall apply: while „searching“ the government tasks, such activities are 
determined, whose performance and funding are not included in the scope of interest of private enti-
ties, however, there is, for some reasons, requirements for them in the society.  
for instance, smith mentioned, that the government or another central power shall fulfill the follow-
ing three tasks:11 
1. to protect the people in the ruled society against violence and invasion of aggressors other societies 
(currently concept of national defense); 
2. to protect each member of the society against injustice and oppression of others and the obligation 
of establishing exact rules for justice implementation (currently national security and legislation);
3. to implement and maintain certain public institutions, which can be object of neither individual 
nor small group of individuals since the benefits cannot cover the costs of such individual or small 
group, but society gains some benefit anyway. 
The first two or three tasks of the government (see the footnote ) are unquestionable in case of 
existence of human community within a territorial unit with autonomous behavior with regard to its 
external environment (mainly in a state). also more than two-hundred-year experience proved these 
tasks. We define them as the “limited government in the strict sense of the term“. an example of such 
successful minimum (limited) government was in england in 1�th century. 
 
roger scruton used different wording to define the limited government: „it is a sovereign execution of 
power restricted to the areas of protection of undeniable rights and freedoms, private property, rule of law, 
justice, order and security both in- and outwards“ (scruton, 1���).
James Buchanan and ronald coase used different methodology to define the limited government. 
Both of them call attention to the fact that it is possible to define in advance neither specific activi-
8 strictly in accordance with principles of traditional conservatism, the order should be vice versa. for instance, Paul elmer More                    
wrote in 1�15, that „for civilized human, the property rights are more important than the right to life“ adding that „nearly everything 
what makes our life more important than that of animals is related to our ownership ...“ (nisbet, 1��3, pp. 70-71). Moreover, in 17�3, 
edmund Burke wrote that “just the disrespect to the property and the fact, that some alleged virtues of the state are put against the 
ownership principles, are the causes leading toward all other evils that destroyed France and threw the entire Europe into an imminent 
danger“. see nisbet (1��3), pp. 70-71. 
� see, for instance, Gonda (2005a).      
10 in this section, we introduce just framework and basic characteristics showing the government role in the society.                
11 adam smith has defined three government tasks. However, the second task is de facto ensured by the mean of two functions in                      
praxis: legislation (including the courts) and security (see smith �1776�� 1��3). 
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ties, which could be defined as public goods nor any criteria or arguments defining the government 
tasks.12 They affirm that only market-based activities are natural and only gradually and by the mean 
of evolution it is possible to prove that the government might either carry out or finance some of them. 
Thus they refute one of the key arguments (e.g. of samuelson and Musgraves)13, that so-called market 
failures constitute an argument for government interventions in the economy.  
James Buchanan, as the main representative of public choice theory, argued in favor of limited gov-
ernment on the base of decisions of the governments (or other state representatives), arising from 
subjective preferences of the decisive voters’ demand. He mentions that “...in democratic society based 
on the majority choice rule there is no restriction, which might preclude the qualified majority to change 
the private property into a public one“ (Hampl, 2001).
ronald coase defines in similarly evolutionary manner and ex post the reasons of creation of the 
government tasks in his concept of “lower transaction costs“14. He states as follows: „the lower will be 
the transaction costs for the making and enforcement of agreement and exchange, the sooner they will 
be based on market rules.  The more simple will be defined and enforced the property rights, the lesser of 
non-market transactions shall occur spontaneously.“ He mentions defense as the public goods histori-
cally developed on the base of comparison of transaction costs15 for the individuals. The defense of an 
individual or small group against other states would be for him/them very expensive and therefore, it 
developed historically into “public goods“.  
However, unlike the publicly administered defense, developed naturally on the based of high transaction 
costs, he defines the public social security as artificial public goods (developed “only“ due to the fact that 
both people and politicians do not like the market outcome related to this issue, including the risk).    
as a consequence thereof, and accepting the third government task defined by adam smith (carried out 
in several forms in praxis), the range of government functions can be increased as follows: for instance, 
keeping of the price stability or country’s foreign policy. Within this context and in accordance with the 
third government task defined by adam smith, also other government functions arose in praxis, since no 
individuals and/or smaller groups of people are not interested in such tasks, however, for certain reasons, 
these tasks have importance for the life of community (state). There can be mentioned programs of poor 
people protection and those aimed toward those members of society, which cannot be considered as legally 
capable, including the children.16 This is how we define the “limited government in the broader term“.  
in modern times, Hongkong was an example of successful country with limited government and the 
highest economic freedom for its residents (mainly before it passed under the chinese possession 
again). today, the closest countries to this concept in praxis are the countries with economic success, 
such as ireland or new Zealand.  The government size in terms of economics (measured as the ra-
tio of public expenditure to GDP) is today in ireland about 30% (see section 3.2.1 for more details). 
However, the governments of the european „welfare states“  administer and redistribute much more of 
12 a definition of “public goods“ in such conditional manner and throughout the evolutionary progress is in contradiction with the stan-                   
dard concepts, which are the most spread in economics textbooks (even for “pure“ public goods) of Mussgraves and Paul  samuelson, 
who define (pure) public goods based on the criteria of „non-rivality in consumption“ a „non-exclusion from the consumption“.   
13 for example, samuelson-nordhaus (�1�8��� 1��2), pp. 327-8.      
14 aside the “transaction costs“ concept, coase uses also the „property right“ concept to contradict successfully the argument of                   
“externalities“ used for justify the government interventions in the economy.
15 Besides that, an important criterion for (non-)inclusion among the government activities is the concept of “economies of scale“                  
(niskanen, 2005).
16 see friedman-friedman (�1�82�� 1��2).     
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their economy (e.g. about 54% of GDP in france). at the same time, the performance of the economy, 
the living standard and the economic freedom in the latter states are lesser and grow more slowly17. 
for example, the comparison of ireland and france confirms the validity of rahn curve, thus the inverse-
ly proportional relation between the government size and economic output of the economic subjects in 
the country, however, with the curve maximum at the approximate level of 10% of GDP (Chart ). 
Chart
Relation Between Government Size and Economic Output
Source: Mitchell (2005), chart modified by authors.
The governments of the individual countries left behind just the limit of tithe and the limited govern-
ment concept at the end of 1�th century. Thence, the strongest impact was evident in sweden as one of 
the freest economies at the end of 1�th century. While in 1870, swedish government redistributed only 
6% of the sources generated in the country, today this figure increased to 60% approx. (Chart ).  
Chart 
Development of Ratio of Public Expenditure to GDP in Some Countries 
Source: tanzi (2005), chart by authors.
17 This corresponds to the outcome of index of economic freedom, published yearly by Heritage foundation (               www.heritage.org).
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We find the concept of limited government as the condition of long-term economic progress (thus 
also for the increase of population living standard) for slovakia as well. However, also the follow-
ing rule shall apply for the limited government: it has to create and keep rules related with the rights 
and obligations of individuals within the society, mainly it has to guarantee the protection of life and 
property. However, it should not carry out those things, which carry out almost all the governments: 
market regulation and replacement of voluntary activities of the citizens.
Therefore, it is crucial to define the specific functions, which the Government of the slovak republic 
should (and could) ensure and the level of (mandatory) social solidarity to be guaranteed. step by step, 
the government should come to the performance of its basic functions “only“, however at higher qual-
ity (than today) and in more effectively.  Thus, under the limited government, we do not mean weak 
government, but such government, which performs restricted number of functions in as full-bodied 
manner as possible.  
for slovakia, such functions of limited government in the loose sense of the term can be determined 
as follows:
▶ legislation and justice (with emphasis on property right guarantee); 
▶ foreign affairs; 
▶ defense of the citizens;
▶ security of the citizens; 
▶ subsistence level for those who really need the help;
▶ basic level of education of the children.
Within a long-term orientation and based on this unambiguous concept, it could be possible to deter-
mine with relatively high precision, whether some public expenditure (and how much) should exist or 
not and which expenditure does not constitute a government function and thus should be eliminated 
(see chapter 4 for more details). Within social sphere, a government task is the assurance of subsist-
ence level for those who really need the help.
1.2 Principles Applicable within Social Sphere 
Principles related directly to the desirable status within the social system are following to the basic 
values and tasks of the government in society with market economy. They are mainly the following:   
1. individual responsibility and self-sufficiency; 
2. voluntary solidarity and private initiative; 
3. subsidiarity and decentralization;
4. individual-targeted social solidarity at the basic  level;  
5. benefit entitlement is based on giving the counter-value (“nothing is for free“)
6. competition of private providers18
18 for more details on principles under the points 5 and 6, see            Chapter 4. hereunder. 

Draft of Welfare Reform in Slovakia
Ad : Individual Responsibility and Self-Sufficiency 
a free and responsible, self-sufficient individual and (his/her) family are the key assumptions of long-
term economic and non-economic successful, working community. Market economy with unlimited 
(or as unlimited as possible) competition, with clear rules of “the game“ and guarantee of property 
rights gives individuals their personal freedom and space for personal responsibility (a “state“ protects 
this by the mean of laws). Whether and how they will use or not this space in praxis, depends on the 
individual life-related attitude of each of them.    
The observance of the principle of personal responsibility requires, first of all, trust in their own abili-
ties and readiness to bear the responsibility for their activities and for the financing of themselves 
and their families. This also means to aim the help for poor people in accordance with the concept of  
„teaching them fishing instead of giving them fish”1� in order to improve their abilities and skills, which 
make them possible to escape from the poverty. amartya sen, a laureate of nobel Prize for economics 
in 1��8, defined just the individual abilities and skills as “the base for assessment of individual advan-
tages (including the social ones) and prerequisite for enjoying the individual freedom“ (Bohatá, 1���).
natural (and inevitable) differences among the people in the society, both financial and those related 
to the level of conscience on this freedom and utilization of its advantages are the consequence of dif-
ferent abilities and skills of the individuals. This fact, proven by many centuries, affirms the senseless-
ness of the contemporary attempts of unification (so-called “harmonization“) and/or reduction of the 
natural differences, targeted to averaging (see Section . for more details). 
The application of individual responsibility principle in praxis also press the people to the self-help 
and thereby to their self-respect and self-confidence. This gives them greater independence, qual-
ity of life and incentives for activity (also for social activity). so, this may result in their increased 
togetherness and voluntary solidarity with “weaker“ citizens within their society.  
Ad : Voluntary Solidarity and Private Initiative
together with the self-help, both voluntary solidarity and natural grass roots originated initiative for 
help constitute another important principle within the social system. like the voluntary exchange of 
goods between demand and supply characterizes the market, the voluntary solidarity characterizes 
the well functioning social relationship within the society. The natural institutions who were able to 
ensure such voluntary solidarity in the past (and are able to do so today as well) are, first of all, the 
family and other relatives, friends or the ”neighborhood“ and all forms of private providers of social 
services and other assistance – nGos, church and other private and on voluntary basis working com-
munities.  
for example, Berger and neuhaus, in their study to empower People, defined the private organiza-
tions working in social system as the mediating structures. (not only) they think that these organiza-
tions have irreplaceable position within the society as the institutions standing between the individual 
and his private life on one side and big public institutions on the other side. volunteering and charity, 
mainly the christian charity20, spread successfully, for example, in the u.s. and in england from the 
1� chinese saying: “Giving a fish to the poor man, you will feed him for one day; teaching him the way of fishing, you will help him                          
for his whole life.“ 
20 for instance, Burke mentions the christian charity as fully sufficient and complete alternative of government programs for assis-                 
tance to poor people nisbet (�1�86�� 1��3).
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“Poor laws“ era.21 for example, the extent of private donation in the u.s. corresponds to more than 2% 
of the entire GDP and the share of individuals in the donation is about 80% (strečanský, 2000).  
it is not only the experience of these two countries, which confirms that private institutions are much 
more efficient than public institutions. at substantially lower costs, they are able to provide real help 
to an individual in his greatest destitution. They find their way to such an individual much quicker. 
This is because they emphasize his social and psychical transformation instead of keeping him pas-
sive within the social system. for private institutions, the individualized attitude is obvious and the 
paperwork level is lower than in public institutions.  However, today they suffer more and more the 
„strangulating embrace“ of the governments (see section 2.1.2 for more details).
 
Ad 3: Subsidiarity and Decentralization
The principle of subsidiarity and decentralization overlaps both above-mentioned principles. This 
means that as low level as possible should ensure anything it is able to ensure. friedrich august von 
Hayek said that in other words: ”The relying on solidarity, love or social spirit as a mechanism for social 
co-ordination can be applied only in small open societies; this feeling loses as soon as the growing society 
dimensions start to separate the individuals form each other.” (Hayek, �1�44�� 2001). an individual and 
his family are the cornerstones for the application (not only) of this rule in the society. 
once their self-help fails, an opportunity is given to private, charitable and other social-assistance 
institutions. and it is only after that – when all natural institutions (individual – family – charity) will 
fail – when the government23 may, and we think, should fulfill. However, also in this case, the rule of 
priority to act for lower levels of the „chain“ shall apply: municipalities at first, then regional govern-
ments and only at last the central government. The only exceptions are the powers in such areas as 
the creation of legislation and inspection and enforcement of the law observance; all this shall ensure 
primarily the central government. 
Therefore, the decentralization, i.e. the correction of the deformed centralization status (status of dom-
inant position of central authorities within government sector and with regard to the decision-making 
and funding), is the prerequisite of well working subsidiarity. However, the public sector decentrali-
zation is not self-redeeming. for example, in conditions of slovakia, the regional administration is 
subject to lesser public control than the central government; however, this is the aftermath of wrong 
regional division of the country. Despite of all, generally shall apply that the decentralized decisions 
are controllable more easily, also by the voters. Therefore, they are supposed to be cheaper and more 
efficient.
Ad 4: Individual-Targeted Social Solidarity at the Basic Level  
any government intervention in social system should guarantee the basic standard of living for the 
people in destitution (subsistence) in accordance with the government tasks in the society (described 
in the section 1.1 hereof). We define the subsistence (existential minimum) a 24 clothing and shelter. 
This is the acceptable limit of the government-enforced and from “public sources“ (taxes and social 
21 see, for instance, Bush – Horn (2003), p. 5.            
22 The subsidiarity principle understood as interpreted in the natural law and roman-catholic social doctrine (see sirico 1��7, p.                  
54�), not in the distorted concept as defined in eu (documents).
23 We use the term of “government” in the looser sense, identical with the term of “general government“. see its definition in                     Diagram 
5 of the Annex.
24 The term “appropriate“ means indispensable for life.      
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contributions)25 funded social solidarity. However, this solidarity shall be more individual-targeted 
than the proposals for conditions of slovakia as given in the section 4.1). 
on the contrary, a person without income and asset sources for assurance of these basic vital needs 
(subsistence) is really poor.26 nobody who, although having relatively low wage or social benefit, owns 
a house or even a car, is really poor.27 nor a human who has relatively lower income than the median 
income of his country (this is claimed to be so-called relative poverty in eu) 28.
Therefore, and in accordance with this principle, the government assistance should be aimed only to 
the poor people, according to strictly assessed and proven and provable individual and/or family needs. 
This principle can be considered the only acceptable mandate for public social policy. Therefore, it is 
the base of the entire text hereof, including the measures for the proposed welfare reform in slovakia. 
it is the antipole of universality in the social system. 
We find the universality as non-systematic element and not efficient enough; it also squanders the 
sources up to certain degree (mostly due to no differentiation of needs and thus, guarantee of payment 
made from taxpayers’ money to all, including the people with higher incomes).2� The universality of 
the claim for benefit from public sources increases the demand thereof and, subsequently, the expend-
iture amount based thereon. This expenditure may exceed costs for mean-test in targeted system. The 
key distortion of the universality in public (incl. social) system consists in depraved expectations and 
relying on the government. Thus it causes the increase of the “put out and filled palms“ phenomenon. 
This contributes to the strengthening of the “culture of dependency“ and passivity of considerable part 
of the population. This would be contradictory to the above-mentioned natural principles, including 
the individual-targeting principle on the basic level.
25 We use the habitual term of “public sources“ understanding that their origin is in private sector; i.e., they are always private sources                      
only. However, after their mandatory acquisition from the people, they are administered and reallocated by the government (gen-
eral government).
26 see Gonda-Dostál (2004) and Dostál (2005).     
27 relativity and exaggeration of the poverty rate can be documented by the example of the u.s., where the inquiries prove that from                      
among those, who are officially reported as poor, nearly half of them (46% approx. in 2003) own a house, nearly three quarter if 
them own a car and almost all own a color tv set and refrigerator (rector, 2004)
28 eu defines the relative poverty as a percentage of the population with income lower than the 60% of the median value within the                       
society. We think, this is absolutely irrelevant with regard to the real poverty. That figure shows only the inequality rate in income 
distribution throughout the country. considerable income differences must not mean necessarily that the country has big percent-
age of poor people. The poverty itself should not be confused with social inequality. income and property differences among the 
people are obvious and their rectification is not a government task. Most of the crucial problems within the social affairs are related 
just with the confusion of real poverty with lower income of part of the population.
2� an example for this are the child allowances, payable and paid to all parents, at equal amount, throughout slovakia. They are simi-                      
larly universal in another 14 oecD countries (e.g. in austria, Denmark and others), while in 11 oecD countries, the child allow-
ances were transformed into individual-targeted poor parents (e.g. in australia, italy etc.). for more details, see Plošná..., 005.  
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2. Distortions in Praxis
2.1 Distortions of Social Systems Worldwide
The governments worldwide turned away (some of them more, others less) significantly from the 
natural principles for social affairs. During the past century, the natural principles in social affairs un-
derwent a lot of criticism and lack of confidence. considered as “outdated and not flexible“, they were 
replaced by new “mass and industrialized“ citizen, who arose from the dust of dishonored tradition 
and human nature.
today, most of the governments give priority to their goals compatible with such short-term aspects 
(unlike the goals desirable in long term as defined on the example of slovakia in chapter 4) as the 
intention to gain political advantage during the election periods. Mostly, the governments attempt to 
assure many goals simultaneously, going often behind those, which assurance they should guarantee 
of. such attempts of the government as the reduction, or even rectification of the income differences 
within the society (in accordance with the concept of so-called relative poverty) or making equal the 
conditions for the people based on other differences (e.g. sexual) belong among those short-term and 
politically fashionable goals. also the attempts of safeguarding of so-called “economical safety and so-
cial securities“ belong among such pseudogoals, as well as the attempts related to political acceptance 
of economic reforms and elimination of social risks and so-called social exclusions.
The disagreement on bases and goals within social affairs can be defined as interference with the equi-
librium among the government, society, communities and citizens. Therefore, we understand under 
the term of “deformed praxis“ in social affairs the challenging and giving up of natural social and eco-
nomic roles, which should play (under optimal conditions) these subjects. 
also in historical context, the key deformations can be introduced by the mean of negative trends 
of the social policy from the middle of 1�th century, mainly in relation with the increase of “welfare 
state”30 and their heritage, which deepened the substantial deformations in social affairs. 
2.1.1. Negative Trends in Social Affairs from 19th Century
We mention the following negative trends in social affairs, which affected and still affect the social 
policies worldwide and mainly in europe:  
1. creation and increase of mandatory insurance schemes;
2. Growth of government redistribution and welfare state expansion and decline; 
3. european social Model.  
30 The ” welfare state” term appeared for the first time in the work of archbishop William temple called ”Citizen and Churchmen”, 
written in 1�41. He used this term to identify the state, which provided to the people in destitution (i.e. handicapped, poor, old etc.) 
material care by the mean of legal and administrative means.    
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Ad : Creation and Increase of Mandatory Insurance Schemes
in the second half of 1�th century, the insurance institute appeared based mainly on human desire to ensure 
the income for dignified standard of life in case of unpredictable event endangering the life or property. 
Demand for insurance of such life risks as unemployment, disability, disease or the old age (although this is 
predictable event) left its response in the offer of private insurance companies. Therefore, voluntary choice 
of the client based on the calculation regarding the income, consumption, saved money and the eventual 
costs related with the event subject to the insurance, determined the extent and nature of the insurance.
However, subsequently was created so-called social insurance, whose purpose was to protect collectively 
the people against the risk (of poverty) and guarantee the minimum social standard31.  for the first time, 
this appeared in Bismarck Germany. The “iron chancellor“, while implementing the mandatory insur-
ance of the employees32 in 1882, 1884 and 188�, pursued the goal to weaken the strengthening social 
democracy and avoid the class struggle. He succeeded to manipulate the government into the role of 
paternalistic tutor, who separates its citizens from the voluntary insurance schemes, hands over their 
individual responsibility and generates its claim for their loyalty. The remaining european countries fol-
lowed the German pattern soon. 
The anglo-saxon countries opposed this trend for the longest time. The mandatory social insurance in the 
u.s., where the supreme court opposed the effort to introduce the mandatory insurance system for a long 
time, has been implemented for lower and middle class as late as in 1�35 (within new Deal scheme), when 
the resistance of supreme court judges was broken due to devastating impact of the economic crisis and 
due to the nominations for new supreme court judges of the president f. D. roosevelt.
Table  
Summary of Creation of Social „Insurance“ in Selected Countries
Insurance  
type
Country
Accident Sickness Old age Unemployment
volunt. mand. volunt. mand. volunt. mand. volunt. mand.
Belgium 1�03 18�4 1�44 1�00 1�24 1�07 1�44
Denmark 18�8 1�16 18�2 1�33 18�1 1�07
finland 18�5 1�63 1�37 1�17
france 18�8 1�46 18�8 1�30 18�5 1�10 1�05 1�14
The netherlands 1�01 1�13 1�13 1�16 1�4�
Germany 1884 1883 188� 1�27
norway 18�4 1�0� 1�36 1�06 1�38
austria 1887 1888 1�27 1�20
sweden 1�01 1�16 18�1 1�13 1�34
switzerland 1�11 1�11 1�46 1�24
italy 18�8 1886 1�28 18�8 1�1� 1�1�
u.k. 1�06 1�46 1�11 1�08 1�11
australia 1�02 1�45 1�0� 1�45
canada 1�30 1�71 1�27 1�40
new Zealand a 1�00 1�38 18�8 1�38
u.s. 1�30 1�35 1�35
Source: večeřa (2001), p. 5�.
31 The “collective logics” assumes that if all the people will be insured, we have the certainty that nobody will fall under certain (not                       
too high) life standard. However, this ”minimum social level” refuses risk as the main feature of the insurance.
32 This was mandatory health, accident, old-age and disability insurance.        
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Ad : Growth of Government Redistribution and Welfare State Expansion and Decline
The implementation of John M. keynes’ (British economist) macroeconomic theories in praxis brought 
more significant increase of the government (powers) and its intervention in economy. These theories 
advocated large government interventions in economy with the purpose of increase of the efficient 
purchasing power and number of jobs by the mean of public expenditure. keynes recommended 
to the government to influence the savings and investments via low interest rates and public work 
schemes. in scandinavia, the economist karl G. Myrdal developed the „ideal“ of welfare state, which 
became the primary agenda of social democrats, which won dominant position in nordic countries 
between the world wars.
several subsequent events made possible the mass support for the welfare state: 
1. The first decades of the past century brought two World Wars and the Great Depression. These 
events unified the national communities in engagements of mutual “collective solidarity“ as type 
of group identity strong enough to generate a movement “against“ or “in favor“ of collective goal. 
such collective principle (”folkhemmet”) gave the legitimacy, for example, to the scandinavian 
welfare state; 
2. centralization trends in the power execution within social affairs are related to the collective 
solidarity; such trends are based on ethnical community, the ”volksgemeinschaft”, which is 
concentrated around the state uniform institutions, where the individual rights are subordinated to 
the collective interests; 
3. popularity of managerial and industrial ideals of ”fordism” and ”taylorism”, representing the mass 
production, central planning; the center (management) hierarchic structure started to implement 
downward, in relation to the society. The growth limits for social schemes ceased to be defined by 
the individual interests in helping to the needed individual and started to depend on virtual limits 
of social (collective) contract of the citizens.33
after World War ii, the massive redidtributing and compensating schemes “boomed“ for two decades. 
This was tied closely with progressive taxation of the citizens, claim pseudologics related to social 
rights without support in sources and counter-value and (egalitarian) social citizenship.34 after World 
War ii, the ratio of social public expenditure vs. GDP increased, when compared with the pre-war pe-
riod. The British labourist experiment of lord Beveridge and swedish “maximalist model“ of welfare 
state became the patterns believed to be followed. removal of the existing diversity became the goal. 
Welfare state was understood as legitimate from-cradle-to-grave tutoring institution.
The intellectual mood of the sixties helped to spread the illusion that the poverty is not an individual’s 
failure and it has no relation to his personal effort and qualification. on the contrary, consensus pre-
vailed that poverty is failure of the society and government is the only one who may rectify it.35 This 
was the spirit of massive package of schemes of the u.s. president l. B. Johnson called Great Society 
and War on Poverty, which has reallocated us$ 8.3 trillion from 1�65 in social schemes, health insur-
33 The very expensive scheme of     New Deal developed by the u.s. president f. D. roosevelt fits well to the hue of that time. it was 
example of social engineers’ response to the impacts of the Great Depression. Beside the implementation of the above-mentioned 
mandatory social insurance, it meant large (however efficient for only short time) public works and social benefits to single moth-
ers, widows and children.    
34 We do not want to legitimize both of these terms, however, we find it necessary to emphasize, that they are based on the work of t.                          
H. Marshall called Citizenship and Social Class. according to Marshall, the modern citizenship developed from the democratization 
during the last three centuries. in 18th century, the cornerstone of the legal enactment of civic rights occurred, and the political 
rights surged in 1�th century. Marshall deems the consolidation of social citizenship in 20th century as the culmination of the 
democratic ideals. for more details see castles – Pierson (2000), p. 32 and kabele (2003), p. 2.
35 see Murray (1�84), p. 2�.     
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ance for poor and old people and other structural and compensatory measures. an underclass of frus-
trated, social benefit-addict citizens closed in the long-term unemployment trap has been generated.  
Hidden crisis of welfare state has burst out during the oil crises in 1�73 and 1�74. Due to lower econ-
omy outputs, the governments were unable to pay the increased costs related to claims based on the 
social schemes; these costs increased proportionally with higher number of unemployed and those 
addicted in long term. The danger appeared of long-term uncovered liabilities caused by aging of the 
post-war “baby-boom“ generation, generosity of PaYG pension systems and the generous coverage of 
health care from public sources. Maintenance of welfare state became morally and financially hazard-
ous issue. it caused and still keeps on causing significant pressures on funding of increasing claims for 
official system benefits; this also increases disproportionately taxes and social contributions.
Ad 3: European Social Model
ethical and economical problems related with the (non)working social systems in europe are deeper 
and deeper also due to european social integration. This should, by the mean of convergence, approxi-
mation and harmonization36, come to a unified european social space, based on mandatory observ-
ance of so-called social rights and citizenship. The „diseases“ of social systems are transferred from 
national to european level. european social Model37 is mentioned as the synthesis of shared values 
and attitudes in social policy, based from so-called social equality and strong position of the government 
in social affairs.
Thus, european social Model preserves the deformed praxis in various eu countries, where the exces-
sive social solidarity enforced by the government led to long-term problems in economic performance 
and life standard and to their remaining behind the u.s. and other dynamically increasing econo-
mies. Most of the eu countries face problems with high taxing, social contributions and public debts 
(also caused by too generous social systems). Moreover, alan Greenspan identified too high protection 
standards of labor code as the cause of eu remaining behind the u.s.; this, together with excessive 
authority of trade unions, causes inflexibility of the labor market and decreases the labor productivity. 
trends in economic and social integration pose risks for new eu Member states.  
2.1.2. Heritage of Deformations in Praxis
after a brief summary of key negative trends in social affairs, we indicate the main deformations. The 
impacts of welfare state deformations can be, in simplified manner, divided into economical (pres-
sure of increasing costs and low efficiency), political (loss of welfare state legitimacy), demographic 
(increase of costs related with the aging of population) and psychological (the addicts remain closed 
in the underclass trap and the culture of dependency is generated). 
as far as the poverty and long-term unemployment problems concerns, it is more than justified to 
emphasize the following system deformations: 
a) too large government role in social affairs (throughout public expenditure for social transfers, 
provision of services etc.) and its position as dominant (or monopolistic) provider of services in 
36 convergence means increasing similarity of social systems in Member states; approximation means the introduction of common                
minimum standards and elimination of differences in social affairs among Member states. Harmonization is the active regulation 
by the mean of law harmonization, implemented within the limits of a Member state sovereignty.
37 for more details, see, for example, novota (2005a).       
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social affairs, which causes, among other things, also significant relying of individuals in government 
and generates the vicious circle of “culture of dependency“ without achieving of economical self-
sufficiency of individuals and families;   
b) disproportionate growth of social public expenditure at relatively low economy growth, while in most of 
the european countries and the u.s. the annual growth of the real GDP or GnP38 oscillates between 1 and 
4% and requires high administrative costs (and this preserves the permanently non-efficient social public 
expenditure) and considerable funding sources;
Table  
Ratio of Social Expenditure to GDP in Some Countries (%)
Country
1985 1990 1995 2001
public private public private public private public private
australia 13.5 - 14.2 - 17.8 3.� 18.0 4.�
Denmark 27.� 0.4 2�.3 1.0 32.4 1.1 2�.2 1.3
france 26.6 - 26.6 1.6 2�.2 1.8 28.5 2.0
The 
netherlands
27.3 2.� 27.6 3.8 25.6 4.6 21.8 6.2
Germany 23.6 2.4 22.8 2.5 27.5 2.6 27.4 2.4
ireland 22.1 1.4 18.6 1.4 1�.4 1.6 13.8 0.4
korea - - 3.1 - 3.6 3.2 6.1 4.4
new Zealand 18.1 0.1 21.� 0.2 18.� 0.5 18.5 0.5
norway 1�.1 0.� 24.7 1.� 26.0 1.7 23.� 2.1
slovakia - - - 0.0 1�.2 0.5 17.� 0.4
sweden 30.0 1.2 30.8 1.3 33.0 2.� 28.� 3.5
switzerland 15.1 3.1 17.� 1.5 23.� 1.� 26.4 1.�
u.k. 21.1 3.2 1�.5 2.� 23.0 3.7 21.8 4.4
u.s. 13.0 6.3 13.4 7.5 15.5 8.2 14.8 10.3
eu 15 22.� - 23.4 - 25.6 - 24.0 -
Source: see oecD (2004a) for social public expenditure and estimation of adem – ladaique (2005) for social 
private expenditure. 
c) generously and largely conceived social solidarity enforced by the government (in form of social 
contributions, services and other public assistance), which pushes away the forms of voluntary 
solidarity; low share of social private expenditure in total social expenditure, oscillating in most of 
the european countries between 1 and 10% proves that, while the same share in the u.s. is about 
41% approx.3�; 
d) in advance guaranteed and paid social benefits based on so-called “social rights“ and so-called “social 
citizenship“ without any base in sources; moreover, these are universal and payable to anybody (not 
only to those really needed) without due counter-value. child allowance paid universally is the example 
of such benefit. attempts for keeping the guarantees of social rights push up the social expenditure 
quickly. Therefore, the guarantees are not reachable economically. This undermines significantly the 
legitimacy of welfare state and causes the growth of social tensions; 
e) regulations of labor markets – existence of minimum wage, regulations for employers and 
safeguarding of employee “protection“, limitation of working time and restriction of freedom of 
38 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) represents, in terms of money, the amount of all produced assets within the economy without in-                   
termediate consumption. Gross national product (GnP), used more in the u.s., includes both GDP and net income and production 
factors (labor, land, capital) from/to abroad. real GDP or GnP express their values with correction of inflation impacts.
3� Data from adem - ladaique (2005).     
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choice of employees, guaranteed powers for trade unions and exaggerated importance of “social 
dialog“; 
f) creation of new social rights related with “anti-discrimination“ (equal wage for female and male, 
gender equality), “social exclusion“ (of sexual minorities, youth etc.) or attempts of positive 
discrimination of the “socially excluded“, causing the adverse effect as intended;
g) other supranational regulations and restrictions (e.g. limitations of free movement of labor force 
in some eu countries, “compensation“ attempts for regional differences by the mean of structural 
policy etc.). 
such enduring long-term deformations of the public social systems lead to the following aftermaths: 
▶ significant pressure on funding sources (converted into high tax and contributions burden on the 
people); 
▶ higher unemployment rate, mainly the long-term unemployment rate and lower living standard in 
such countries (including many countries of Western europe) than in more liberal countries (for 
example, see the comparison dwelling space per households in Chart 8 in the annex);
▶ numerous problems for private and voluntary actors (besides their direct exclusion by the 
government), for example:
– low ability for self-help, personal responsibility and responsibility for own family;  
– introduction of practice typical for public institutions (e.g. the paperwork related to their activities) 
into private entities; crushing of voluntary private entities by the public sector and 
– lower efficiency of their activity.  
too much paperwork and other negative phenomena more habitual in general government become 
more and more a part of activities of private organizations working in social sphere. as early as in 
1�77, Berger and neuhaus described such government’s strangulating embrace of the voluntary sector in 
the study mentioned in Section .. today, this happens due to funding of their activities from public 
sources and expansion of various partnerships between public and private sectors. 
Moreover, there is an additional strong financial and other influence of eu inside the european area. 
relying of many voluntary institutions on government’s and supranational sources often causes that 
they leave their original missions (at least by the mean of partial adaptations to the requirements 
of governments and/or supranational donors) and at least partially lose their independence while 
searching original solutions. lower efficiency of their activity and increase of corruption in voluntary 
solidarity and philanthropy come as the consequences.
2.2 Long-Term Problems of Social System in Slovakia
While the Western democracies suffered long-term, gradual and more or less significant deviation 
from natural principles in social policy, the development in communist countries was far more dev-
astating: it refused totally the natural principles (as defined in section 1.2). slovakia and the other 
countries with communist regimes during the second half of 20th century even today face not only the 
influence of Western type of welfare state, but still with the aftermaths also of the communist model of 
society, which was enforced during four decades.
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2.2.1 Historic Bases of Current Problems in Slovakia
2.2.1.1 Heritage from Communism 
The communist coups d’état after World War ii, in addition to the establishing of political totality, per-
secution of political opponents and brutal infringement of human rights and civic freedoms, brought 
to the nations in central and eastern europe also the liquidation of the market economy, introduc-
tion of planned economy, disrespect of private ownership and economic freedoms of the citizens. The 
“state” (read government) controlled and managed all areas of the society life, including the social 
affairs. 
The communist ideology was based on refusal of capitalism and market economy. under communist 
regime, planned economy substituted the free business and competition; “state ownership” substituted 
the private property. Within the planned economy framework, the full (officially 100-%) employment 
became the base of the social policy. The government guaranteed citizens the right to work, on the 
other hand, also the obligation to work existed. The communist rulers argued that the non-existence of 
unemployment is the proof of socialism superiority to capitalism. However, in reality the full employ-
ment was kept artificially, paying for it the price of overall low labor productivity, inefficiency of the 
entire system, averaging incomes and social overemployment related mostly to unskilled labor. There 
was neither labor market nor employment policy as understood in countries with market economy40. 
The government planned and determined both wages of employees and prices of goods. Thus, the gov-
ernment social policy was implemented also by the mean of centralized control of wages and prices. 
The government subsidized the prices of certain goods (e.g. food), services (e.g. transportation) and 
house-rent in order to keep them artificially at lower level. The wages did not express the real price on 
the labor market. They regarded the individual output only within minimum extent. The criteria were 
rather based on the notion of central planners related to the importance of the individual professions, 
preference of manual work to intellectual work and capacity of the national budget. 
child allowance was introduced in czechoslovakia after the World War ii. in 1�48, national insur-
ance was introduced in order to unify several types of social insurance existing already in pre-war 
czechoslovakia. During the 1�50s, government-funded system of social security replaced the social 
insurance system.  This replaced the income based on salary during the old age, sick leave, disability, 
maternity etc. The system did not include unemployment insurance, since there was no unemploy-
ment. The system was centralized and under full control of the government. in addition, the system 
created illusion that the government provides citizens the social security „free of charge“. 
The communist model of society caused, as far as social affairs concerns, important system distor-
tions, which endure more or less up to now:
a) total control of social policy by the government caused that the execution of social policy was 
completely nationalized and centralized; all alternative, first of all, the natural and voluntary forms 
of social solidarity run by churches, charity and nGos were liquidated or suppressed; 
40 “The government institutions for manpower planning dealt only with planning and redistribution of manpower as well as the solu-                  
tions for manpower recruiting to some branches of the domestic economy, which lacked employees. Marginally they have dealt 
with acquisition of substituting jobs and assistance for persons seeking for such job, provided this situation was caused by restruc-
turing (organizational changes).” see tomeš (2004), p. 154.
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b) the status of dependency on social incomes provided by the government led to the understanding 
that the social incomes (in form of social benefits, but also the prices of goods and services 
subsidized by the government) ceased to be a substitute or complement to work incomes during 
the period of destitution. They began to be understood as relevant, legitimate and even claimable 
part of individual’s income as far as the amount of money concerns; 
c) the loss of individual responsibility for own situation and relying on the government, perceived 
generally as the entity whose obligation is to take care of the people and who is responsible for 
their standard of life more than themselves, led to an environment with incentive loss, with only 
a marginal relationship between the individual’s effort and output on one hand and his income on 
the other hand; this caused passivity;
d) high redistribution rate via public sector created extremely expensive and non-efficient social system, 
which could work only within the economy based on the government commands, when the government 
had under control all economy sources; however, it became non-sustainable in market conditions; 
e) artificially kept full employment was one of the reasons of economic inefficiency of the communist system; 
full employment represented a time bomb for the future, threatening with high unemployment.
2.2.1.2 Social Transformation during 1990s
The fall of communism caused large political, economic and social changes, which created the frame-
work for changes in the system of social affairs. These changes were of less crucial nature than, for 
example, the economic transformation and they just responded to the economy changes and their 
impact on the population social status.
The government ceased to control the economy directly, plan the production, and define the prices 
and wages. in 1��1, the price liberalization brought not only the free pricing for most of goods and 
services, but also eliminated the up-to-then direct subsidizing of food prices; during the socialism, 
this was the de facto tool of government’s social policy41. unemployment became the concomitant 
phenomenon of this economical development. The social overemployment from the socialist era con-
verted into long-term unemployment, which “affected” the emerging market economies stronger than 
developed market economies.42 
in that time, the welfare reform was conceived as set of measures in order to compensate the social 
impacts of the economic reforms. The mitigation of negative social impact of the economic reforms 
was perceived as the prerequisite for keeping of political acceptance for the economic reforms. Good 
example was the compensation of food price growth by the mean of the government’s compensation 
benefit, which was paid to everybody since 1��1; in 1��2, its amount has increased, but it was paid 
only for pensioners and children. 
after the separation, the slovak system of social affairs developed towards the welfare state model. 
system of mandatory social insurance43, which included both old-age and health insurances under 
41 in 1��0, the government subvention for food was 27 billion czechoslovak crones in czechoslovakia. see rys (2003), p. 33.                   
42 long-term unemployment is not related only to the significant increase of number of unemployed people during relatively short                  
period after the transition to market economy, to the inability of the economy in recession to generate new jobs and absorb the un-
employment growth as well as the inability of institutions dealing with labor market policy, but mainly with the fact that the social 
overemployment mostly affected unskilled and under-skilled manpower; for these people, it results more difficult to find new job 
once they become unemployed.
43 in 1��3, national insurance company was established; this has split in 1��4 to social insurance agency and General Health                   
insurance company. 
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the administration of social insurance agency (sia). also the mandatory unemployment insurance 
was introduced and thence administered by the mean of national labor office (nlo). sia and nlo 
bodies were established on tripartite basis – government, associations of employers and trade unions 
delegated their representatives therein. nominally, the creation of separate institutions for social af-
fairs separated the financing of social insurance from the national budget – the insurance payment is 
financed from mandatory social contributions paid by employees, employers and freelancers, while it 
is the “government“ who pays the social contributions for part of the insured people; in other words, 
they are paid from taxpayers’ sources. also social support (dedicated mainly to families with children) 
and social assistance (dedicated to people in material and social needs)44 are paid from the taxes. 
The government continues intervening significantly also in labor market: it enters in relations between 
employers and employees and it has its own labor market policy with regard to the job applicants. 
legislation defined the minimum wage and the labor code stipulated in detailed manner the rela-
tions between employers and employees. trade unions and the collective negotiation got strong po-
sition in determination of wages. The employment authorities, aside the unemployment insurance 
(labor market passive policy), implemented also the labor market active policy, i.e. measures in order 
to increase the employment, mainly by the mean of re-qualification training and promotion of crea-
tion of different types of jobs.
The following features were typical for the transformation of social affairs in 1��0s:
a) social system reform responded to changes in economic system and, mainly at the beginning, the 
reform was made subsequently to these changes;  
b) despite the declaratory emphasis on individual responsibility, still prevailed the attitude of 
paternalism and attempts to preserve the caring government; 
c) the main changes of social system occurred more in institutional sector (creation of insurance funds 
separated from the national budget, new structure of the social policy system, decentralization of 
certain areas of social policy and their devolving to regional governments) than in the change of 
basic concept (transition from tutoring government towards natural principles in social affairs);
d) support of position of trade unions in the system of collective negotiation at enterprise, branch and 
national levels, which lead even to the establishment of tripartite at national level.
2.2.2 Definition and Reasons of Current Problems in Slovakia
The substantial long-term problems in social sphere and the distortion of its financing system in 
slovakia are caused by long-term political, economical and social development during communism 
and the subsequent transition period as well as the external impacts, mainly from european union 
(eu).45 
They are related to one deep-rooted distortion: excessive role of the government in the economy and 
society, which is manifested not only in social affairs. it is reflected not only in the government’s at-
titude to the solution of problems in individual segments of social sphere, but its aftermaths are also 
put highly in the value ranking of the population.  
44 Material need means the situation, when the income of the citizen drops under certain minimum limit defined by law. social need                     
means the situation, when the citizen (mainly due to his high age or unfavorable health condition or handicap) is unable to ensure 
his basic life conditions nor with the help of his family. 
45 Mainly the european social Model, in the loose sense of the term, also the long-term distortions of social systems in european                     
countries (see Section . for more details).
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2.2.2.1 Substantial Long-Term Problems in Social Sphere in Slovakia
While defining the substantial long-term problems in social affairs, we find the base in the definition 
of basic tasks of the limited government in the society (Section .) and the principle of individual-tar-
geted social solidarity at basic level (Section .). Therefore, as the substantial problems in social affairs 
should be considered those, which are related directly with the poverty, which is mostly connected 
with the long-term unemployment. such substantial long-term problems of social affairs in terms of 
slovakia are mainly the following:
a) dependency of significant portion of the population on social benefits and its related passivity;
b) low rate of voluntary solidarity and private activities in social sphere; 
c) high and, for economy, retarding costs for the social system functioning. 
These system distortions are the main poverty source and contribute significantly to the inability of 
many individuals to cope with the problem of long-term unemployment and the related poverty. 
Ad a): Dependency on Social Benefits and Passivity
Dependence of many individuals and entire families on social benefits and their relying on the gov-
ernment’s support is the aftermath of deep-rooted distortion in thinking of the people and system fail-
ures in the economic and social system running. The people adopted, during the communist regime, 
conviction that not themselves, but someone else, mainly the government, is responsible for their liv-
ing standard. The loss of personal responsibility for their situation and the situation of their family as 
well as the culture of dependency as phenomena generated by the communist rule remain unchanged 
even after the transition of the economy into market terms. 
The persisting paternalistic attitude to social affairs did not generate the convenient environment for 
this change. The income based on social benefits was, in certain cases, even higher than the working 
based income, what led not only to the social system abuses, but also to strengthening of the culture 
of dependency in considerable groups of population. The situation when the income based on social 
benefits provided without any counter-value was higher than the potential wage, caused the incentive 
loss for the unemployed people while seeking for job in order to solve their situation. 
The social comfort guaranteed by the government and lacking the pressure on individual respon-
sibility led to passivity, relying on the government and low ability to solve independently the own 
situation or to solve it with a support provided within the family. This had and has grave consequences 
mainly for the part of population, which was unable to adapt to new market terms and which is af-
fected by long-term unemployment and the related features of poverty. 
Therefore, this group, with increased share of unskilled or underskilled persons, consists the major 
problem among the unemployed and long-term unemployed people in slovakia. These people often, 
due to long-term unemployment, have lost their labor habits or they even never acquired them since 
they became unemployed as soon as they finished the school. These people are not only long-term 
unemployed, but they also are hardly employable. in accordance with estimations based on statistical 
data on combination of long-term unemployment, basic level of education and too high or too low age, 
this group consists of 100,000 persons approximately (i.e. 2% of the whole population in slovakia)46.
46 one hundred thousand unemployed form the hard core, trend. July, 7th, 2005.           
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in terms of quantity, the poverty (typically with lack of sources to ensure one hot meal per day, appro-
priate clothing and shelter) has not societal significance in slovakia. However, the problem consists on 
the concentration of the most hardly amenable and employable citizens living in roma settlements. 
The mentioned problems concentrate significantly in roma settlements, whose inhabitants are, more 
than others, long-term unemployed and poor. according to extensive social and demographic survey 
of roma communities in 2003, approximately 50,000 inhabitants live in these settlements outside the 
towns and villages, in the settlements at the margin of the town of village there are 70,000 inhabit-
ants and more than 30,000 other roma live in concentrations within the towns and villages47. in total, 
they represent approximately 3% of the slovak population. organization for economic co-operation 
and Development (oecD) estimated the roma share on total unemployment to be one fifth and the 
unemployment rate in roma settlement �0% approx. in 200248. in some roma settlements, the unem-
ployment is nearly 100%.
   
Box 1
Ivan and Sylvia – A Standard Slovak Underclass Story
ivan is 33 years old, sylvia 32 and they have in total seven children. sylvia is in fifth month of 
her gravidity. They live in a roma settlement with 400 roma inhabitants (100 men, 110 women 
and 1�0 children under 18). together with the children, they dwell in two rooms and the kitchen 
works also as the living room. ivan does not work 10 years already; sylvia stopped to work when 
she became pregnant for the first time. Their oldest daughter, iveta (15 years old), is sexually ac-
tive. it is likely that she will become pregnant during the next year. Their oldest son, Peter, is 13 
years old and it is likely he will become sexually active within one year. ivan insists permanently 
that he wants to work and he will be not choosy. He knows manual works with shovel and 12 
years ago he worked as bricklayer assistant. However, the same requirements and experiences 
have also the other 100 men in the settlement, but the mayor is able to help to only as few as 
twelve of them.  When ivan was 18, he received the draft notice; he simulated mental retarda-
tion and so he had not to be drafted. now, this sin has avenged on him. any potential employer 
has good reason to reject him. ivan and sylvia owe skk 40,000 to an usurer plus skk 8,000 for 
electric power. When ivan was in the shop, he had to buy food for skk �0. He bought cigarettes 
for skk 50 and bread and paste for hungry children for the remaining amount. Does the benefit 
increase help to ivan and sylvia? no, it surely does not. The usurer will consume everything. 
Does the activation works help them? for skk 1,500 they will remain passive and without feel-
ing of responsibility as they were before, although ivan is willing to work. But he will not be one 
of the selected twelve whatsoever. resignation and passivity are ruling in the family. 
Source: Baker-Hanšut (2004)
Ad b): Low Rate of Voluntary Solidarity
The widespread passivity and relying on the government are expressed not only in the personal responsi-
bility loss in case of individuals for their situation, but also in low rate of voluntary forms of solidarity. in 
general, communist regime liquidated the natural, thus voluntary, expressions of solidarity. The govern-
ment assumed the whole responsibility for the execution of all forms of social policy and did not accept-
ed the activity of private entities in this area4�. The feeling of personal responsibility for the own fate has 
47 Správa, 005.  
48 oecD economic survey, slovakia, June 2002     
4� trade unions and employers played certain roles in social policy, however, they could not be considered as independent due to their                     
interconnection with the government and much less they could be considered as private entities.
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been suppressed in case of most of the population; similarly was devastated their feeling of responsibility 
for others and the consciousness of personal obligation to help the people in destitution. 
although the change of rule and economic system enabled again the work of nGos in private sector 
and the church charities, the general idea that it is the government who is responsible for the solution 
of social problems, endured and remains deep-rooted. too large and widely conceived importance of 
the solidarity guaranteed and enforced by the government, together with heavy social contributions 
and tax burden, did not generate an environment favorable for the development of voluntary forms 
of solidarity. on the contrary, the mandatory social solidarity enforced by the government crowd-
ing out the voluntary forms of solidarity and makes them just a kind of an appendix of the social 
policy implemented by public institutions.  
The government goes on “protecting” the citizens, by the mean of mandatory insurance schemes or 
various social benefits, against different social risks. This just strengthens the idea that the govern-
ment’s responsibility is primary and deprives the incentives for development of voluntary activities 
and donation for charities, which are still very undeveloped. This is affirmed also in the fact that the 
share of private donation on GDP in slovakia is as small and 0.5% of GDP approx. and that the indi-
viduals’ share on this donation is one third approximately; this gives a great difference to the u.s., for 
example (for more details, see Section .)50.
Ad c): High and, for Economy, Retarding Costs for the Social System Functioning
systemic and long-term problem in social sphere of slovakia is also the disproportionably high costs 
for its working. These costs are related with the mandatory quality of the individual sub-systems and 
they are caused by social system distortions, mainly due to excessive share of mandatory solidar-
ity and too high mandatory social security contributions (see section 2.2.2.2 for more details). such 
setup of social affairs funding system invokes pressure on public funding and required large amounts 
of money. 
Primarily, it is transferred into high social contributions burden, which represents as much as 36% of 
the average labor costs per employee. This index is one of the highest in oecD countries, right behind 
Poland, france, austria and Hungary (Chart 3).
50 see strečanský (2000).  
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Chart 3
Comparison of Social Contributions Burden in OECD Countries (004)
Source: oecD (2004b), diagram by authors.
High rate of social contributions burden in slovakia is the essential obstacle of creating new jobs 
and thereby unemployment decrease. The reason consists in the fact that high social contributions 
(described briefly in Section ...2), together for personal income tax (Pit), are increasing the non-
wage portio n of the labor costs. This causes that the employers loose incentives to employ, mainly 
those underqualified and non-qualified workers, thus, the people with lower income and more long-
term unemployed. Maximum limit of income for payment of social contributions cause that the so-
cial contributions are mostly burden of labor cost at such jobs. it is because the employers are willing 
to employ the underqualified and non-qualified workers only at lower labor costs. Moreover, the ap-
plicants for such jobs loose motivation to become employees due to small difference between net wage 
(which is lower also due to higher social contributions) and income during no work periods.51 
The international comparison within oecD countries affirms the proportional relation between the 
rate of social contributions (and tax) burden and the unemployment rate. Just such countries with 
highest share of social contributions on labor cost as Poland, france and slovakia belong within oecD 
to the countries with the highest unemployment rates. on the other hand, the countries with the low-
est social contributions burden, such as new Zealand, iceland, australia and ireland have some of the 
lowest unemployment rates in oecD (compare chart 3 and 9 in the annex).    
The average tax and social contributions burden of the per employee labor costs oscillates in slovakia 
at the level higher than 52%. in 2005, this was even slightly higher (52.4%). for an average employee, 
in accordance with calculations of association of taxpayers of slovakia and f. a. Hayek foundation, 
only less than 48% of his gross wage in 2005 remained (see chart 4) after the payment of all social 
contributions and taxes.    
51 see, for example, Gonda (2005b).    
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Chart 4
Average Tax and Social Contributions Burden of Labor Costs
2005
Taxes
,5%
Average 
net wage 
7,%
Social 
contributi
ons 
5,%
Source: chren (2005) 
similarly expensive system will be, in case of increasing requirements (mainly with regard to the age-
ing of the population), more and more unsustainable. High rate of redistribution for social purposes 
restrains the overall economy performance, makes harder the creation of new jobs and strengthens 
the passivity within the society of people in destitution on one hand and those who might help by the 
mean of voluntary forms of the solidarity on the other hand.
2.2.2.2 Distortions of Social System in Slovakia
Mainly the enduring problems in social affairs, and in some cases, even increasing distortions of the 
social system, cause the long-term problems in social affairs. These are derived from the main system 
distortion, which is (not only in social affairs) consisting in excessive role of the government in the 
society.  all problems are the manifestation of this role in different segments of the social affairs. at the 
same time, they represent a deviation from the desirable natural principles, which should be applied 
in social affairs (see Section . for more details). it is paradoxical that despite the application of these 
principles, mostly the government justifies its attempts to protect the population against the risk of 
poverty and unemployment; but in reality just these distortions are the main obstacle of the efficient 
solution of poverty and long-term unemployment problems. 
on the other hand, remaining these distortions is caused also by the value ranking of the population, 
which is influenced by the heritage of communist rule as well as the insufficient reforms of the social 
system in the past. The politicians’ carefulness during their elimination is the consequence.
The most important distortions of the slovak system are mainly the following:
a) too large, generous and widely set role of government related to the guaranteed social solidarity;
b) high social contributions and other mandatory payments in social affairs; 
c) cash benefits and positive social rights guaranteed in advance, provided universally and without 
requiring any counter-value;
d) prevailing of mandatory forms and public pillars in the system;
e) regulations on labor market;
f) strongly centralized system of social policy;
g) intricacy and non-transparency of the social system.
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Ad a): Too Large, Generous and Widely Set Role of Government Related to the Guaranteed Social 
Solidarity
The social solidarity guaranteed by the government is set too generously and widely. This is shown in 
all segments of the social policy. Wide scale of different events is covered by the mean of mandatory 
social insurance: old age52, disease, parenthood, handicap, accidents, and job loss, basically all the 
situations when the individual looses the job income. child allowance is an example, since they are 
not targeted and they are paid to all families with children, including those, which are not in material 
destitution53. Thus, social support as a part of social policy is provided also to those people, which are 
not needed and have sufficient income. Despite of the recent changes, the help to the people in destitu-
tion has still more nursing than activating nature.
The social policy costs represent more than 30% of the total general government expenditure; in many 
cases, this is a mere redistribution without any legitimate justification, consisting in a help targeted to 
those, who are in destitution and needed for such help.  The government, having such attitude, devi-
ates significantly from the desirable status, in which it should guarantee the citizens just the minimum 
life standard. 
too large extent of the social solidarity enforced by the government has negative impact also on the 
individual responsibility of the people for their situation. it supports the passivity and marginalizes the 
voluntary forms of social solidarity as well as the activity of private entities in social affairs. 
Ad b): High Social contributions and Other Mandatory Payments in Social Affairs
too large extent of the solidarity enforced by the government and the expensive system of social policy 
cause high social contributions and tax burden on the population. The mandatory social contributions 
and other mandatory payments in social affairs54 represent 47.8% of the tax base (most often of the 
gross wage) and nearly 36% of the total labor cost.  slovakia is one of the countries with highest rate of 
social contributions within oecD (see Diagram 3). 
Table 3
Mandatory Social contributions before and after the Changes in Social System
till December 31st, 2003 from January 1st, 2006
em-
ployee
em-
ployer total
self-
em-
ploym. 
em-
ployee
em-
ployer total
self-
em-
ploym.
unemployment 1.00 2.75 3.75 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
guarantee 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
sickness 1.40 3.40 4.80 4.80 1.40 1.40 2.80 4.40
52 Within the consequence of execution of the pension reform, the people have the possibility to pay a part of the funds (�% of the                        
assessment base) to private pension saving companies instead of public old-age “insurance“ in social insurance agency. However, 
the payments are also mandatory and they reduce in no way the social contributions burden.
53 The child allowance is paid universally for each child, in amount of skk 540 per month. The child allowance share on the national                       
budget expenditure in 2004 was skk 6.8 billion.
54 This includes social insurance (health, old-age, unemployment, guarantee, accident and solidarity reserve fund) and health insur-               
ance and part of income from taxes and other revenues dedicated for social transfers (e.g. the government social support ben-
efits).
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pension 6.40 21.60 28.00 28.00 0.00
old-agea 4.00 14.00 18.00 18.00
disability 3.00 3.00 6.00 6.00
solidarity reserve 
fund 4.75 4.75 4.75
health 4.00 10.00 14.00 14.00 4.00 10.00 14.00 14.00
total 12.80 38.00 50.80 4�.80 13.40 34.40 47.80 47.15
Difference 0.60 -3.60 -3.00 -2.65
Note: a – Mandatory social contributions for old-age pension show the example of an insured person who did 
not enter into the capitalizing pension saving. for the insured employee, who entered into the capitalizing 
pension saving, his employer pays �% of the assessment base to the private pension administration fund and 
5% only to the old-age insurance within sP. However, this has no impact on the total amount of insurance pay-
ments.
Source: Dostál-Gonda-Thomay (2003), sP, Ministry of labor, social affairs and family of the slovak republic, 
authors.
High social contributions increase disproportionately the non-wage portion of the labor cost for the 
employers and have negative effects on official employment. This causes the development of black 
labor market, when the people are being employed outside the formal labor contract, or, addition-
ally to the formal labor contract, concluded for the minimum wage, the employee receives part of the 
remuneration in informal way from the employer. simultaneously, the informal employment reduces 
the generation of sources based on social contributions. together with the tax burden of labor, the 
social contributions are the greatest obstacle for the development of small and medium-sized enter-
prises and the jobs generation, thus it is a barrier precluding (mainly the long-term and unskilled 
manpower) unemployment reduction (see Section ... for more details). 
The second government of Mikuláš Dzurinda stated in its Government Program Declarations dated 
in november 2002 the following: “The policy targeted to decrease the public debt will generate, together 
with the reforms of the most important public spenders, space for reduction of social contributions and di-
rect taxes.“ The government saw the direct relationship between social contributions burden changes 
and unemployment reduction. Despite of this, neither this government nor its forerunners dared to 
implement the relevant reduction on social contributions (see Table 3). only during the last year of its 
work, the government started to consider the reform of levies. 
Ad c): Cash Benefits and Positive Social Rights Guaranteed in Advance, Provided Universally and with-
out Requiring any Counter-Value
Great part of social policy in slovakia is not individual-targeted. it is not aimed only to the assurance 
of basic standard of living for the people, who really need help and to protect them against the poverty, 
but its goals are much more ambitious. Thus, such policy has often the nature of social engineering. 
Many social benefits are paid without verification whether such payment is really necessary or not and 
most of the benefits are paid without requiring for any counter-value from their receivers. 
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This is significant with regard to the issue of social support of families with children, where the gov-
ernment made changes, which even made the system less individual-targeted. child allowance is paid 
universally; no verification, whether the family really needs such support or not is made. This benefit 
is paid regardless the income and economic status of its addressee; the only title to pay it is the mere 
presence of the child in the family. However, this may hardly be deemed as legitimate reason for re-
distribution, if assessed from the point of view of limited government principles.  This allowance is 
also paid for studying “children“ older than 18, who are de facto adult people. The parents’ decision to 
have children is not real disadvantage, which the government should compensate to the parents by the 
mean of redistribution of sources. 
also the parent allowance became less individual-targeted. This allowance is paid to the parents of 
children under 3 or 6 years old (the latter applies, if the child has a long-term health problems). in the 
past, this benefit served as a partial reimbursement of working-based income for those parents, who, 
due to the all-day care of small child ceased to work. However, this benefit is also payable universally 
today, i.e. also to those parents who are working. 
on the other hand, the changes in the system of help to people in material need mean that at least part 
of the help (activation allowance) started to be bound to the recipient ’s activity in form of either labor 
or training activities. Despite that, it is still the lesser part of the social benefit income of such person. 
in general, the mere fact of payment of any cash benefit without demanding any counter-value to peo-
ple who are able to work should be considered as problem. 
These distortions of social policy system increase dependency of individuals to social benefits, foster 
(not only) their paternalistic expectations and increase their passivity in detriment of the individual 
initiative and personal responsibility. 
Ad d): Prevailing of Mandatory Forms and Public Pillars in the System
Mandatory forms dominate within funding of social sphere in slovakia and the space for voluntary 
insurance is minimal. only the unemployment insurance for self-employed is voluntary; however, for 
the employees and (employers) also this insurance is mandatory. The remaining forms of insurance 
social contributions (old-age, disability, sickness, guarantee and accident insurances and the solidarity 
reserve fund) are mandatory. also the old-age insurance in private capitalizing pillar is mandatory55. 
also the participation in complementary pension insurance is voluntary, however, this does not re-
place the mandatory pension insurance; the former is just additional to the latter56. in its Program 
Declarations of 2002, the government compromised to promote the strengthening of voluntary forms 
of pension saving and insurance, but in reality, the importance of mandatory insurance remained 
nearly unchanged (and within the pension system, it even increased). This constitutes the main obsta-
cle for larger implementation of voluntary schemes in pension saving and insurance.
The fundamental problem of mandatory insurance is the following: it replaces the individual respon-
sibility of the people in such situations, when each of themselves could and should assume the respon-
55 although the up-to-date insured persons may decide whether they will remain in the PaYG system within social insurance agency                   
(1st pillar) or they opt for private capitalizing saving (2nd pillar), however, this does not affect the total amount of their insurance 
contributions. The only decision they make, is whether the employer will pay for them � % of their gross wage to social insurance 
agency or to a private company. even after they opt to participate in the 2nd pillar, the payment for pension saving remains manda-
tory all the same as the payment of old-age insurance.
56 since the mandatory items of the pension insurance or insurance and saving represent as much as 28.75% of the gross wage, the                      
incentive to participate also in voluntary pension schemes behind the mandatory insurance is significantly weak. see, for example, 
Gonda – Dostál (2004).
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sibility for his future. This shall also apply for such situation of income loss, which are predictable in 
long-term (old age – pension insurance or mandatory capitalizing saving) and which one may prepare 
in long-term to (voluntary insurance, saving, investment). in case of short-term reimbursement of 
such income-loss situations as disease or unemployment, there would be no problem with letting the 
individuals to decide freely, whether they want to insure against such risks or not; if yes, up to which 
amount they would like to do so. 
The implemented changes strengthened significantly the merit principle within the social insurance 
system. This means that entitlements of the insured person against the insurance system depend on the 
paid amount of contributions. The merit principle is appropriate in the voluntary insurance system, 
but it has no logical justification within mandatory insurance. The merit principle in mandatory insur-
ance means that the insured persons with higher income are forced to pay higher contributions with 
the reasoning that they will be entitled for higher pension (sickness benefit, unemployment benefit), 
although the insured persons with lower income may participate in the insurance system with lower 
insurance contributions (in terms of absolute figures) and later receive the accordingly lower benefits. 
There is no sound reason why the insured persons with higher income should not have the possibility 
to opt for lower insurance contributions as well. The transition to the merit principle in mandatory 
insurance recognizes the possibility of free selection of the premium amount by the insured person 
directly. for the future, it is recommendable to replace the merit principle in social insurance by its 
voluntariness. 
another distortion consists in the “splitting“ of social contributions between the employee and em-
ployer; this just makes unclear the overall labor cost and social contributions burden level. The exist-
ence of guarantee insurance and solidarity reserve fund within sia can be deemed as groundless. The 
guarantee insurance is a non-system reimbursement of wage entitlements of the employees originated 
at those employers, who became insolvent and thus unable to meet their obligations related with these 
employees. This insurance makes the employers, who meet their obligations to their employees and 
behave in responsible manner, to pay the debts of those who do not do so and behave in irresponsible 
manner. solidarity reserve fund has to serve for participation in settlement of debt in 1st pillar of the 
pension system and to reimburse the damages occurred in the 2nd pillar. However, it would be more 
appropriate to finance the both items from other sources (e.g. privatization resources and/or savings 
in public expenditure). 
Ad e): Regulations on Labor Market
The labor law became more flexible in slovakia after the changes made in labor code during election 
period between years 2002 and 2006. in comparison with most of the other eu countries, this law 
is more liberal. The administrative barriers for labor market and excessive protection of employees 
remains. 
nevertheless, as far as the principle of limited government concerns, the existing status can be identified 
as persisting distortion caused by undue government’s intervention into the market relationships between 
employers and employees. The current law in slovakia remains too detailed and restricts in groundless 
fashion the contractual freedom in the labor market. for relations between employers and employees, 
the legislation should just create the indispensable framework instead of detailed regulations. 
also the legal definition of trade union powers against the employers is insupportable. The relation-
ships between trade unions and employers should also be based on their mutual agreement. During 
this election period, there were positive changes in this issue, since the tripartite act was repealed. 
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However, this act applied at national level only. at the level of the companies, the powers of trade un-
ions guaranteed by the law remained unchanged. 
specific restriction for the labor market consists in excessive protection of employees against their 
firing. according to World Bank57, slovakia has the second most strict regulation of protection of em-
ployees against firing from among all oecD countries. The job termination is too demanding for both 
paperwork and time. such strong legal protection of employees “enables” to keep considerable share of 
long-term unemployed. for slovakia’s conditions, also good law for partial-time contracts is missing. 
also the time limits for fixed job contracts makes the labor market less flexible, as well as the missing 
law related to fixed job contracts.
 
also the existence of minimum wage is a system distortion of labor market. Minimum wage interferes 
the contractual freedom between employers and employees, and, in some cases, it may constitute an 
obstacle for employment, mainly of underskilled manpower in activities, whose market value does not 
exceed the minimum wage value.
The eu pressure and ambitions to regulate and harmonize also this area at european level pose threat 
for the flexibility of the labor law (not only) in slovakia. it is just too large regulation and rigidity of 
labor markets, which causes higher unemployment in european countries than, for example, in the 
u.s.  
Ad f): Strongly Paternalistic and Centralized System of Social Policy
social policy system is strongly centralized in slovakia. There are two segments of social policy fully in 
government’s hands: social support for families with children and social insurance, except 2nd and 3rd 
pension pillars. However, their weight remains smaller than that of 1st pillar, which remains in social 
insurance agency and even regardless to that, the mandatory 2nd pillar is more dominant than the 
voluntary 3rd pillar. The remaining types of social insurance remain in hands of sia, which is under 
government control, and there is no space for the existence of private and voluntary unemployment 
and/or sickness insurances. 
only the social services, which constitute a form of support to citizens in social need, were devolved to 
local and regional authorities. although both central government and lower level authorities partici-
pate on the remaining two segments of social policy, i.e. on help in material need and the active labor 
market policy, most of the powers are in hands of central government or the employment authorities 
managed by it. no conditions for more intensive action of private entities, whose activities are regu-
lated excessively by the law, are created in the area of active policy for labor markets. Within public 
sector, the shaping of labor market policy is centralized. The rules are given at national level and this 
disables to formulate this policy with regard to local needs and to create various alternative models 
of the unemployment solution nationwide. such models could compete mutually and could be com-
pared as far as the solution efficiency concerns. 
The design reform of social assistance in material need took into account that after two years, the 
responsibility for assurance of basic life terms of people in destitution will pass to the municipal au-
thorities. However, before the end of this period, the force of this provision was postponed. Thus, the 
57 see Doing Business (2006).   
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decisive responsibility for the help to people in material need remains in hands of specialized employ-
ment authorities controlled by the central government. 
Therefore, the responsibility of municipal authorities, which know better the situation in their respec-
tive localities, remains very restricted. This reduces the efficiency of the policy implementation. since 
the basic rules and tools are defined at central level also in this issue, the possibility of municipal 
authorities to implement specific strategies is minimal. This precludes the generation of competitive 
environment, which might contribute to the search for more efficient conditions, which could be tai-
lored for the specific locality, for the appropriate solution of the poverty problems. 
 
Ad g): Intricacy and Non-Transparency of the Social System
The social system is intricate and non-transparent. it includes a lot of mandatory social contributions 
and even more various social benefits. Part of the social policy is financed from taxes (national budget 
and local and regional budgets) and the other part from various types of social “insurance”. 
from among eight mandatory social contributions58, seven are paid to the same institution (sia), ex-
cept the health insurance, which is paid to health insurance companies. The system includes different 
ways of calculation of the assessment base for social and health insurance as well as for various types 
of income (e.g. job-based or business-based incomes). it defines various maximum assessment bases: 
for unemployment and guarantee insurances, the 1.5 times of average wage; for accident insurance, no 
assessment base is defined and for other types of insurance, 3 times the minimum wage.  
The minimum wage is the assessment assessment base, but in the past, there were also several mini-
mum assessment bases, although the insurance types were divided in groups different to those used 
at maximum assessment bases5�. in the past, both minimum and maximum assessment bases for the 
individual types of insurance were defined as fixed amounts; today, the minimum assessment base 
is bound to the minimum wage and the maximum assessment base to the multiple of average wage. 
Due to this, both maximum and minimum assessment base are increasing continuously (maximum: 
every year; minimum: whenever the government increases the minimum wage). The splitting of the 
social contributions payment (even for the same types of insurance) between employers and employ-
ees makes unclear the real social contributions burden rate and real labor costs.  
The system of social benefits is even more intricate. it contains as much as 53 different benefits, grants 
and contributions as well as two another forms of financial support of social nature (tax bonus for 
child and social contributions bonus for child; however, the latter was cancelled as of January 1st, 
2006). The number of benefit types increased significantly right during the period of the current gov-
ernment – in 2002, there were “only“ 33 types of benefits60. nine benefits of government social sup-
port are stipulated in six different acts. The social benefits are universal regardless to the real need of 
the receiver. certain of them are non-system, based on single payment and have no relation with the 
social situation of the receiver; they relate to certain event – e.g. child birth benefit, funeral benefit as 
well as single-payment benefit in case of start and end of tutorial care are paid. although the slovak 
army is fully professional already and both basic military and civic services are cancelled, the act on 
58 The unemployment, guarantee, sickness, old-age, disability, and accident insurance, solidarity reserve fund and health insur-              
ance. 
5� for pension insurance, this was skk 4,000 per month, while for unemployment and health insurance skk 3,000 per month.                  
60 for more details, see sul�k, 2005. r. sul�k mentions as much as 56 types of payments, which are the tools of the government’s social                        
policy. aside the benefits, contributions and grants, he includes among them also the tax bonus and reduction of social contribu-
tions per child as well as non-taxable minimum of the taxpayer.
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care contribution designed for families of soldiers in basic military service and persons carrying out 
the civic service are still in force. 
The tools of active policy for labor markets are included in 12 different benefits in accordance with the 
employment act; the activation benefit in accordance with the act on Help in Material Destitution is 
supplemental to them. some benefits, for example, the health care benefit of skk 50 per person per 
month, have literally symbolical or psychological importance only61. other benefits have nature of 
social engineering and they have no practical impact.62 
61 The health care benefit gives and impression of compensation of payments in health care.              
62 for example, the benefit for job migration is based on naive expectation that the government benefit of skk 10,000 will increase                     
the manpower mobility and will motivate the people to migrate to areas with more job opportunities. This benefit was paid to 51 
persons only during the whole year of 2004. 
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3. Attempts of Solutions for Long-Term Social Problems
3.1. Reform Steps in Social Sphere in Slovakia
after its start in 2002, the second government of Mikuláš Dzurinda performed some reform changes, 
which meant a mitigation, but not systematic elimination of distortions in social affairs: changes in 
labor law and those related to solution of unemployment and material destitution. 
Changes in Labor Law 
in May 2003, the labor code amendment has been adopted. This increased the labor market flexibil-
ity and reduced the degree of regulation of the relations within labor market. several essential restric-
tions of labor market flexibility endured (see Section ... for more details).
The amendment made possible larger application of employment for definite period as well as other 
than full-time employment contracts.  it allows the employers the repeated conclusion of labor con-
tracts for definite period. The labor contract termination with an employee who does not meet the 
requirements for due labor performance became simpler. also the contract termination for less grave 
infringement of labor discipline became possible, provided the infringement was repeated and the 
employee was warned on the possibility of such termination during the previous 6 months. certain 
improvement with regard to the working time modification appeared; the possibility of over-time 
work and irregular distribution of working time also increased. The range of reasons, which the em-
ployer is obliged to provide paid off time for, was reduced.  Partially, also the privileges of trade unions 
in relationship with the employers were reduced. The co-existence of employee council and trade un-
ion body at the same employer is enabled. 
it was due to this change, why slovak labor market became to be considered as one of the least regu-
lated labor markets in eu63. on the other hand, the legislative for relationships between employers and 
their employees remains too detailed, demanding for paperwork and restricting the employers. it goes 
far beyond the minimum legislative framework necessary for these relations. nowadays, the regula-
tions applicable at eu level constitute the obstacle for full elimination of labor market regulations. 
Changes in Solution of Unemployment and Material Destitution
several changes took place in the solution of unemployment and help for citizens in material destitu-
tion after the elections in 2002. from 2003, both amount of benefit in material destitution and overall 
support for the family64 were reduced. The primary reason for these changes was to reduce the public 
expenditure. However, one of the effects of this measure was the increase of difference between in-
63 in the World Bank index called labor Market regulation for 2005, the labor market regulation degree in slovakia is equal to 10,                      
while the value of 0 represents the minimum and 100 the maximum regulation. for comparison, Denmark achieved 17, u.k. and 
Belgium 20, ireland 2�. on the opposite side of this evaluation are countries with strongly regulated labor market, such as spain 
(6�), france and Greece (66), Portugal (58) or Germany (55). source: Doing Business 2005
64 Before 2003, no maximum amount of family support was defined. from 2003, it was limited with the maximum of skk 10,500.                    
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come based on social benefit and the job-based income. it is just the social comfort, caused by rela-
tively generous social system, which keeps the unemployment high and the people in passivity. 
from 2003, the registered unemployed are obliged to search for job actively and once per 14 days 
come to the employment authority and prove that they are really doing so. The non-compliance with 
this obligation meant the exclusion from the list of registered unemployed persons. in 2004, further 
reduction of help in material destitution65 took place and the difference between job-based income 
and that based on social benefits increased again. to certain degree, the benefit reduction was com-
pensated with system of contributions related with the benefit. activation contribution was new, and, 
from the point of view of the system, the most important from among them. it is designed for citizens 
in material destitution, who increase their qualification or work at smaller community tasks or volun-
tary works within 10 hours per week at least. at the same time, contribution for activation tasks paid 
to municipalities and organizations managing the activation tasks for people in material destitution 
was implemented. 
The performed changes had impact in praxis, since the extent of social system abuse66 and registered 
unemployment rate67 decreased. The basic declared principle of the implemented measure was the 
phrase „working is worthwile“. These measures were aimed to reduce the social comfort and make 
pressure on the activity of the unemployed as well as to make them search for job actively and avoid 
keeping them in passivity. 
Despite these positive trends, the implemented changes cannot be considered as sufficient. often, the 
pressure on the search for job was just nominal and the unemployed did not visit the employers with 
the purpose to find a job, but just to get the confirmation that the employers cannot employ them. The 
activation contribution amount was not motivating, since with regard to the basic amount of benefit in 
material destitution, it is disproportional and also its form is questionable68. The contribution amount 
is related neither with the work done not with the time worked. 
The activation tasks can be performed only for municipalities or limited number of public institutions 
and non-profit private entities. They cannot be done within private entrepreneurial sector.  The fact of 
limitation of the time for activation tasks as low as 10 hours per week (i.e. Ľ of standard working time) 
is troublesome. The mere fact, that to a person in destitution, but able to work, is paid cash support 
without strict demand for counter-value in form of his activity, is the systematic problem of relation 
between basic benefit and activation contribution just as the benefit supplement.   
65 till 2003, the total amount of benefit in material destitution for the family consisted of the sum of benefits of the individual mem-                      
bers of the family, whereas from 2003, the total benefit amount for the family became limited. as of 2004, the act on Material 
Destitution defined the benefit amount for 6 categories: single, single with maximum of 4 children, single with more than 4 chil-
dren, childless couple, couple with maximum of 4 children and couple with more than 4 children. The benefit amount for family 
with 2 adults and more than 4 children was determined at skk 4,210, i.e. 40% approx. from the up-to-then maximum limit of total 
benefit for family in material destitution.
66 That part of people who worked ilegally and simultaneously were paid the benefit in material destitution, was excluded from the                    
list of registered unemployed persons.
67 The unemployment rate as verified in statistical office of the slovak republic dropped from 17.�% in 4th quarter of 2002 to 15.6%                      
in 3rd quarter of 2005. The (registered) unemployment rate dropped from 17.45% in December 2002 to 11.36% in December 
2005.
68 as of January 1st, 2004, an activation contribution of skk 1,000 was implemented. This was an negligible amount with regard to                     
the basic benefit in material destitution, so it could not motivate sufficiently the unemployed to become more active. as soon as on 
april 15th, 2004 the activation contribution was increased to skk 1,500. so prompt change means that the motivation aspect was 
not thought over sufficiently before the contribution implementation. During the writing of this publication, its amount was equal 
to skk 1,700.
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Within the active policy for labor market, institutional and substantial change took place, which, de-
spite certain positive moments, cannot be regarded as sufficient. at institutional level, the instead of 
the national employment authority, constituted at tripartite participation, as well as the network of 
its branches, the labor, social affairs and family center under government control and the network 
of its branches was established. on one hand, this meant the reduction of trade unions’ interventions 
into the performance of employment policy and increase of the government responsibility, but on the 
other hand, neither decentralization nor deetatization of the employment policy took place. although 
in the matter of subsistence, the government’s attitude toward the previous implementation of tools 
in active policy for labor market was critical and so these tools became to be, at least partially, more 
individual-targeted, but they are still conceived too largely and contain lot of different contributions 
and tools with questionable efficiency. 
Moreover, the increase of individual-targeting in issues of social help to people in material destitution 
in this period was accompanied by weakening of the targeting, or even its complete elimination in the 
issue of social support to families with children – e.g. by the mean of universally payable child allow-
ances regardless the family income or paying of parental contribution to working parents as well.
3.2 Reform Patterns Worldwide
The prerequisite for systematic welfare reform solving the gravest problems in slovakia is the exploita-
tion of the experiences from the relatively successful reforms worldwide. no reform worldwide meant 
absolute approximation to the implementation of basic principles in social affairs as defined in section 
1.2 hereof. some (elements) of them, however, are inspiring also for slovakia. for instance, the follow-
ing belong among them:
▶ government’s task reduction in social affairs in ireland and new Zealand (section 3.2.1);
▶ labor market liberalization in new Zealand (section 3.2.2);
▶ self-sufficiency programs in some u.s. states (section 3.2.3). 
aside these, we mention (in Section 3..4) also the examples for use of non-monetary instruments of 
the social policy (in this case, vouchers) in Germany and the u.s. 
3.2.1 Government’s Role Reduction in Social Affairs in Ireland and New Zealand69
The base for description of elements of successful welfare reforms consists in indication of the trend 
framework for two crucial economic reforms related to the government’s task reduction: in new 
Zealand during the second half of 1�80’s and first half of 1��0’s  and in ireland during 1��0’s, signifi-
cant reduction of the ratio of public expenditure vs. GDP took place. in both countries, this took one 
decade approximately to achieve a reduction exceeding more than 10% (chart 5). 
6� our goal is not to describe the issues related to the examples of reduction of government’s task in the society. Therefore, this part is 
submitted at indicative level only. This applies mainly for ireland. for more details on economic reforms in ireland, see, for example, 
fortin (2002), http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/ineas-aes.nsf/vwapj/dp12e.pdf/$file/dp12e.pdf and on those in new Zealand 
during the second half of 1�80’s and first half of 1��0’s, http://www.rogerdouglas.org.nz/default.htm, http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/ and 
www.libinst.cz. 
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Chart 5
Public Expenditure to GDP Development in Ireland and New Zealand 
Source: oecD (2004a), chart by authors.  
Mainly from the second half of 1��0’s, ireland has achieved significant decrease in public social ex-
penditure. Between 1��0 and 2002, the weight of public social expenditure in economy in ireland 
decreased by nearly 5% to less than 14%.  such ratio of public social expenditure to GDP corresponds, 
for example, to approximately half of the same ratio in sweden. 
The reduction of public expenditure in social affairs in new Zealand was not significant in general 
terms, since its decrease in first half of 1��0’s nearly compensated their increase with regard to GDP 
in the second half of that decade. only the government that arose from the parliamentary elections at 
the beginning of 1��0’s, i.e. that one following after the government led by roger Douglas, dared to 
do so. Paradoxically, the reform of social benefit area and crucial market reform took place only after 
the implementation of one of the most successful economical and political reforms worldwide, the 
“rogernomics“ in the second half of 1�80’s.70 
The social benefit reform was intended to deal mainly with the “poverty trap“ problem.71 for instance, 
new Zealand succeeded in that time to change all universally payable benefits (except the pensions) 
to individual-targeted. The government also cancelled the universally payable child allowances. only 
poor parents could claim these allowances (Dvořáková 2000). 
in order to solve the problem of expanding dependency of people to benefits and the poverty trap, it 
was crucial that thence, the government decreased significantly the amount of paid benefits (e.g. the 
unemployment benefit by 10% approx.) and shortened the total period of the benefit payment. in both 
countries there are low (long-term) unemployment rates, achieved also due to low tax and social con-
tributions burdens of the labor costs (see chart 10 in annex). new Zealand is the first in the ranking 
70 The name of “rogernomics” is, like that of “reaganomics” and „thatcherism”, based on the name of the author of the implemented                     
economic reforms. This was, in new Zealand, roger Douglas, finance minister between 1��4 and 1��8. under his leadership, dur-
ing two election periods of ruling labor Party in the second half of 1�80’s, crucial reforms aimed to create market environment have 
been implemented. The tools were, for example, privatization, tax reform, cancellation of government subsidizing for business-
men, deregulation of financial sector etc. However, it was just the labor market reform and reform of social benefits, which roger 
Douglas and his labor Party did not carried out. it was the conservative national Party, who started these reforms after its victory 
in elections of 1��0. ruth richardson, finance minister between 1��0 and 1��3, became the leader of these reforms.     
71 see the footnote 5.   
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
Pu
bl
ic
 E
xp
en
di
tu
re
 / 
G
D
P 
(%
)
New Zealand
Ireland

Draft of Welfare Reform in Slovakia
even when only the social contributions burden of labor costs is compared, since it does not require 
any mandatory payments to public social affairs (chart 3).72 
3.2.2 Liberalization of Labor Market and Government’s Role Reduction in Social 
Affairs in New Zealand  
The reforms of new Zealand government at the beginning of 1��0’s aimed on liberalization, deregula-
tion and decentralization of labor market constitute the example of deeper system changes targeted to 
solve the problems of long-term unemployment. The goal was the creation of conditions motivating 
the environment to generate jobs (in private sector) and the will to become employed as well as to 
release the majority of the increasing number of peoples addict to social benefits. 
crucial reform of labor market became the basic prerequisite for the solution of social problems in 
new Zealand’s society and good pattern for other countries. in 1��0, the conservative government was 
the first one, which resolved to eliminate the long-term enduring labor market distortions, which pre-
vented them from working and caused significant overemployment, latent unemployment and equali-
tarian wages within specific professions. 
Mainly the following belonged among the most accented distortions: 
▶	centrally determined wages and their inspection at individual professions (including the so-called 
farmers’ incomes compensations) and
▶	enacted privileged position of trade unions organized on professional base, mandatory membership 
of employees in trade unions73 and impossibility of individual agreement of employment terms.
in order to solve these system defects, the government adopted in 1��0 the key legislative document – 
The employments contracts act. This helped the government to decentralize and liberalize the labor 
relations and make more flexible the labor market in new Zealand.  The main features of this act are 
the following:
a) Individual Freedom and Responsibility in Matter of Agreement on Labor Conditions 
each employee was given the freedom to negotiate his labor conditions individually or by the mean 
of his representatives on the base of collective negotiation. as of the date of entry in force of this 
act (1��1), no collective contract (within a company) could not be applied to those, who did not 
became their party due to the fact, that they did not agree with its wording.
b) Labor Agent Choice Freedom  
from 1��1, each employee may choice his representative, who will negotiate in his behalf with 
the employer. Thereby the act ceased to guarantee the exclusive position of trade unions and these 
cannot negotiate in behalf of the persons who do not concede them the written consent. on the 
other hand, the employer must respect the authorized representatives of his employees, however, 
he is not obliged to conclude a contract with them.
c) Signature Ban for Those Contracts, which Might Give any Advantages to Trade Union Members and 
Which Demand or Forbid the Trade Union Membership 
Thus, the labor relationship based on contractual freedom of parties, became one of the most flexible 
worldwide and similar to those in the u.s., u.k. or ireland. unfortunately, even new Zealand did not 
72 some authors (for example, Dalsgaard, 2001) state as an example of minimum mandatory social contributions in new Zealand the                   
additionally paid workplace accident insurance premium, paid by the employer in ratio of 1.3%. However, this is a deductible from 
wage costs. official statistics (such as oecD, 2004b) do not include them among mandatory social contributions. 
73 This mandatory membership of all employees in trade unions applied “only“ in those companies, where more than half of the em-                    
ployees adopted that. for more details, see Dvořáková (2000), pp. 61-62.
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avoid some restrictions adopted on the base of amendment of The employments contracts act. These 
are, for instance, the obligations of the employers to respect the minimum wage, minimum holidays 
period etc.    
Due to its labor market reform and reform of social benefits in 1��0’s following the economical re-
forms in the second half of 1�80’s, new Zealand is today one of the most free and economically de-
veloped countries in the world. These reforms contributed to significant economic recovery of new 
Zealand. This found the expression in faster economy growth and reduction of unemployment rate 
(e.g. from 11% in 1��1 to 6 – 6.5% in 1��6 – 1��7 and in Maori unemployment rate reduction from 
25.6% in 1��1 to 15.6% in 1��5) and in inflation rate reduction at the simultaneous increase of the 
citizens’ standard of life. 
3.2.3 Programs Generating Self-Sufficiency in Some U.S. States  
unlike in new Zealand and ireland, the reforms in the u.s. did not aimed toward the government’s 
task reduction, but to strict employment policy programs. at the beginning of 1��6, welfare reform 
ran in the u.s. aimed to the following two problems of thence american welfare state closely related to 
long-term unemployment and “confinement“ of socially needed in the “underclass“ trap:74 (1) finalize 
the addition of individuals and families to government social benefits by the mean of employment and 
marriage support, (2) prevention and precluding extramarital pregnancies and support to keep the 
family with both parents. The base for this reform attempts became the principles of “tough love“75 to 
the neighbor and decentralization of social policy from federal to state level.76 The legislative entities of 
the states became free for experiments, mutual competition and search for the most suitable solutions 
within the feasible and budget-related limits provided in the federal law. 
The universal rules were set as follows:
1. the citizen has no claim guaranteed in advance for the social help and sanctions shall apply in case 
of non-compliance with the criteria,
2. two-year limit for continuous receipt of the social help and benefits was introduced and five-year 
limit for the lifetime receipt thereof; the states may shorten this limit as well as assign exception for 
74 The reform implemented by federal     Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PrWora) brought mainly 
the transition from the key claim scheme called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (afDc) toward less generous Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (tanf). More than 70 remaining federal social schemes remained nearly untouched. The sanctions 
implemented by tanf are applicable only at four similar programs. The reform includes the social assistance and support to poor 
families, but not the social insurance.        
75 This ethos is derived from christian love to the neighbor and assistance for self-help aimed to achieve the self-sufficiency. isabel                    
sawhill defines it as generous social support in form of subsidized health care and care of children for everybody who is activated 
in laboral point of view or works for very low wage. activity of the needed is the base. as far as the individual behavior concerns, 
“tough love“ is divided in three areas: (1) education – in order to exit the poverty and acquisition of positive habits, minimally the 
finishing of secondary level of education is necessary and the education also increases the chance in labor market; (2) family shap-
ing – young couples shall acquire the responsibility for having children only after being married and ensuring of the job-based 
income; the poverty is proportional to the number of single mothers; therefore it must be clear that a matrimony in detriment of 
public expenditure is not acceptable, as well as it is not the fathers’ irresponsibility, since the father has to contribute to his children; 
(3) full-bodied job is the most important element, even in case of very low wage and requirements – it has high value for the behav-
ior long-term change; the long-term job perspective in private sector should be always preferred, although, as the last possibility 
there may exist also certain form of temporary work for public sector; the generous social benefits and other services shall be bound 
strictly to labor activity, in case of families, of one of the parents at least. see sawhill (2003), pp. 7� – �3.
76 some states decentralized the solution of social problems even to county or municipality levels.              Colorado Works program in 
colorado is an example thereof. each county designs its own tanf plan. The state defines the minimum amount of benefits and 
checks the service quality and observance of federal criteria in the counties. The counties may adopt decisions on qualification cri-
teria, sanctions and amounts of benefits and state-unbound grants. The county may decide on decentralization of all social services 
and schemes to private providers. see: Zeigler (2004), p. 37.
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20% of social emergencies; after exceeding the federal period, the families may receive only state-
level benefits,
3. all benefit receivers able to work shall develop, as a reciprocal counter-value for the paid benefits, 
labor activities in private sector, or, temporarily, in public sector, within 30 hours per week at 
least,
4. the states shall ensure that at least 50% (later 70%) of the single parents able to work and receiving 
social support will participate on any form of labor activity; the equivalent limit for normal family 
with two parents is �0%.
5. the states shall meet federal criteria on reduction of number of people on payroll, if they want to 
keep the maximum amount of federal funding.77
first results in the u.s. were positive, since the number of receivers addict to social support decreased 
from 14 millions in 1��4 to less than 7 millions in 2001. 740,000 single mothers found their jobs be-
tween 1��6 and 1��8 and the unemployment rate within this most endangered group dropped from 
1�% to 15%. 
Box 2
More than Story of Two Mothers
in 1��0, two newspapermen, separately from each other, wrote reportings on reverses of for-
tune in the life of two families from the inner downtown of the u.s. capital. leon Dash from 
Washington Post targeted to the fate of 52-year old rosa lee cunningham, farmer’s daughter 
from north carolina, which had her first child as early as when she was 14. shortly after that, she 
was expulsed from the school. later on, she started to prostitute, steal in shops and sell drugs. 
she became addict to heroin and was jailed for illegal dealing with drugs. she had eight children 
with six different fathers, mostly daughters, which ended also with drugs, thefts and premature 
pregnancies. The other journalist, ron suskind from Wall street Journal, studied the fate of 
young teenager, cedric Jennings, who lived with her mother Barbara in the same quarter as 
cunningham. unlike her, Barbara raised three children and worked as clerk with per hour wage 
of us$5 during eleven years. she went to church regularly, lived modestly and supervised her 
children strictly while laying all her hopes for change on them. Her daughter cedric graduated 
cum laude in the secondary school and started to study at Brown university. What are these so 
different stories about? someones like cunningham are poor because they live in the depend-
ency (to guaranteed “social security“), boredom and surrender trap and behave in asocial man-
ner. on the other hand, there are also poor people like Jennings family, which is able to revalue 
also a limited income from low wage. Moreover to that, they provide their children the pattern 
of orderly labor life, which teaches them how to become self-sufficient. 
Source: adapted according to sawhill (2003), pp. 80 – 81.
The poverty rate (based on financial income) dropped from 13.8% in 1��5 to 11.7% in 2001; in 2002, 
the recession caused the slowing of this trend. The children poverty dropped more significantly. While 
77 The funding is based on federal block grants, whose amount is derived from the amount of costs for the previous afDc program                      
for each state in 1��6. This constitutes us$16.5 billions per year, which are allocated among the states. With decreasing number of 
needed, the expenses per recipient increase. They increased from us$7,000 at the beginning of the reform to us$17,000. also the 
structure of the costs is changing. The help in form of benefits and transfers forms 4�% of the total amount, care of children 13% 
and labor activities (subsidized work, professional trainings) less than 10%. The states define both qualification criteria and benefit 
amount for the individuals and families. The states shall observe the federal criteria within the Maintenance of Effort measure, 
which provides for states to keep the current costs at the level of at least 75% of the previous state costs for afDc. see: tanner 
(2003), p. 7�. 
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in 1��5, there were 14.6 million registered poor children, six years later they were 11.7 million. The pov-
erty rate of afro-american children dropped from level of 41.5% approx. in 1��5 to 30% in 2001. 78 
specific forms of social programs, their success and failures are differing state by state in function of 
the prevailing political culture, distribution of political power between republicans and Democrats, 
demography, local economy and other facts. We will mention the following four successful models 
aimed to solve the poverty and long-term unemployment:
1. Wisconsin Works scheme (W-2) in Wisconsin;
2. Jobs Plus scheme in oregon; 
3. competitiveness of providers in new York state and the example of america Works agency; 
4. individual responsibility contract (irc) tool in colorado. 
Ad : Wisconsin Works (W-)    
in 1�86, Wisconsin kept as much as 100 thousand families, thus about 300 thousand individuals from 
among the 5-million population of the whole state, in social programs. one year later, the long-term 
social problems launched tommy Thompson to the governorship. He managed the consent of mod-
erate republicans and Democrats in state legislation to implement experimental schemes, which be-
came the pioneers of the federal welfare reform. firstly, the state administration targeted on some 
behavioral aspects of the social support receivers. The Learnfare pilot scheme required the children 
included in afDc program to observe with the compulsory school attendance. non-observance of 
this condition was sanctioned by the mean of the benefit reduction. The next phase consisted in ex-
perimenting at level of selected counties with the purpose of seeking for suitable solutions of mobility 
of the growing number of receivers addicted to afDc benefits in order to introduce them into the 
labor market.  Both obligation of the needed to search job actively under the supervision of private 
labor agency contracted by the county and strict work-first strategy, demanding the needed to accept 
rather any job, although poorly paid, than replacing it with professional training, were tested.7� 
in 1��4 and 1��6, the first positive results reflected in new reforms - Work First scheme, later renamed 
to Self-Sufficiency First, provided short-term financial help and consultancy to all new applicants for 
social support in order to prevent their inclusion into the system. if the applicant was included into the 
social system, he became obligated to start to work either in private or in public sector immediately. 
new scheme called Pay for performance appeared, according to which the afDc benefit amount was 
assigned to the needed in accordance with the number of hours worked in either private or public sec-
tor of the community. The sanctions were applicable for all prescribed activities, regular participation 
in the professional training, specialized therapy and organized search for jobs. The passive participants 
lost their claim to all afDc benefits and help from Food Stamps scheme.80 While in the remaining 
states of the union the number of families addict to afDc increased from 3.7 million approx. in 1�87 
to more than 5 millions in 1��4, in Wisconsin it dropped from 100,000 to 45,000 in 1��6. although 
in Milwaukee, the most problematic town, the number of system clients dropped by 25% only, in the 
78 see fagan – rector (2003), pp. 3 – 4.         
7� The success of “   work-first” strategy at long-term unemployed individuals is documented in Department of Health and Human 
Services a Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation study of outcome of 20 employment schemes in 2001. 
80 food stamps scheme is administered from the federal        Department of Agriculture. in most of the states, it is executed by the mean 
of specific debit cards with certain amount of money, for which the needed may purchase food in a commercial chain. The card has 
a locking mechanism activated as soon as the needed wants to buy a banned commodity, such as alcohol or cigarettes.  
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remaining areas of the state it dropped by as much as 70 to 80%. Within as short time as 7 months 
from the launching of the schemes, the number of receivers dropped by 33% statewide.81 
However, the heaviest cases, mostly the long-term unemployed without labor habits, remained in the 
dependency trap. Therefore, the team of governor Thompson led by Jason turner started a revolu-
tionary Wisconsin Works (W-2) scheme in 1��7 as universal synthesis of four well proven strategies: 
paternalistic administrative style with regard to the needs of a recipient proving the interest to activate 
himself (care of children, subsidized health care), “work first”, “diversion” (preventing the inclusion 
into the system) and strict sanctions. 
Wisconsin succeeded, by applying the new W-2 strategy and mainly the strict time limits and sanc-
tions, to activate for work 74% receivers approximately.82 The favorized situation for underskilled work 
and employment of single mothers in the nineties helped the high activation. However, the poverty 
rate did not change significantly. it dropped from 8.8% in 1��6 by as little as 0.2% in 2002 and the 
child poverty rate between 1��8 and 2001 dropped by 1.5%.  as far as the self-sufficiency achievement 
concerns, 38.6% of the former clients returned to subsidized jobs in June 2000 and as much as 52.3% 
in June 2004. This confirms the fact that W-2 operates today with the most hardly employable clients 
only.
Table 4  
Summary of Wisconsin Works (W-) Scheme Levels Structure 
Level of W-2 Basic assurance of the  income
Mandatory engagement  
of participants Time limits of the scheme
Non-Subsidized Job market wage + food stamps 
+ eitcb
standard 40 hours per week none
Trial Job minimum wage at least + food stamps + eitcb standard 40 hours per week
3 months per one job con-
tract with the possibility 
of extension by 3 months 
(maximum 24 months)
Community Service Job 
(CSJ)a
us$673 per month + food 
stamps (no eitcb)
standard 30 hours per week 
and up to 10 hours per 
week of education and pro-
fessional training
6 months per one job con-
tract with the possibility 
of extension by 3 months 
(maximum 24 months)
Transition to W- us$628 per month + food stamps (no eitcb)
standard 28 hours of labor 
activity and up to 12 hours 
per week of education and 
professional training
24-month limit, extension 
possible only on the base of 
individual assessment
Notes: The W-2 scheme participants are entitled also for subsidized care of children with different levels of fi-
nancial participation;  a Community Service Job; b Earned Income Tax Credit.
Source: vink (1��8), pp. 41 – 47; modified by authors. 
81 Data according to: rector (1��7), pp. 20 - 23.        
82 Based on DWD study dated on January 1���, which studied the fate of random 375 clients after they left W-2 it was found out that                         
83% had their job after they left the scheme and 62% worked also during the study development. from this group, as much as 80% 
of former clients worked in full-time jobs for an average salary of us$7.42 per hour. see: sherman 2001, pp. 38 – 40.
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each support recipient is obliged to work. The best employable individuals with professional skills and 
experiences can be employed in non-subsidized jobs in private sector only. They get claim from W-2 
for care of children and other auxiliary services in order to avoid their fall into the social trap (“diver-
sion“). for example, as much as 31% of W-2 clients belonged to this category.83 The problematic clients 
are transferred to social expert of the agency (Financial and Employment Planner)84, with whom they 
deal with the barriers precluding their self-sufficiency. 
clients without professional skills may apply for trial job in private sector (only 1% of the clients ap-
proached to this option in December 1��8), which should be temporary form of obtaining working 
habits with perspective of permanent job. W-2 shall refund the employer the generated job, training 
and supervision costs. The employee is paid at the level of minimum wage and entitled to apply for 
eitc.85 The least experienced clients are obliged to participate on community service jobs (as much 
as 51% of the clients approached to this option in December 1��8) in order to acquire the labor hab-
its necessary for trial job in private sector in combination with the prescribed professional training, 
education and consultancy. During this phase, the recipient may get financial support, although only 
based on the W-2 agency assessment stating that he is not fit for working in private sector. The ben-
efit receivers with the greatest obstacles to carry out a permanent job, mainly the addict to drugs or 
handicapped, belong to the fourth, last “transition“ category (17% clients belonged here in December 
1��8).86 
Box 3
The Way to Self-Sufficiency Leads through Job and Community
33-year old coleen clancy from Milwaukee, Wisconsin received alternately the generous social 
benefits from 1�82. she became what some american broadcasters called ironically a “welfare 
mom“; today, we could say, a “career recipientof benefits“. Welfare reforms, which started in 
Wisconsin in half of the nineties, forced her to change her addictive life attitude. in 1��5, coleen 
signed the „self-sufficiency contract“ (analogy to Individual Responsibility Contract) with the 
compromise to leave the social system within five years. During 1��7, she had two jobs: in 
school cafeteria and as bus driver. she ceased to receive the social benefits when she started 
to work and thus gave the best example for her two children, � and 12 years old. according to 
coleen’s words, she became motivated to self-help at the voluntary seminars of assertivity and 
life strategy in the local branch of YMca. she thinks that the federal (state) social system never 
gave her the possibility to make progress and therefore she is owed to faith in God and support 
of her community for her success.
Source: adapted according to rector (1��7), p. 22 and sherman (2001), p. 38.
83 Data according to: sherman (2001), p. 32.       
84 During the first years of W-2 implementation, there were between 120 and 130 clients per case worker, today it is less. for instance,                       
in Maximus agency in Milwaukee, 75 clients are per one employee. see sherman (2001), p. 47.
85 Earned Income Tax Credit – a tool related with labor activity of the needed allowing the tax and social levies discount (payroll tax) 
for employees with the lowest incomes. unlike the increase of minimum wage, this does not affect the employer’s wage costs and 
does not retard his ability to employ underskilled manpower. see: sawhill (2003), p. �2.
86 The scheme has also especial category called W-2        Xtra for the receivers who are able to carry out neither standard work nor com-
munity-service work. These are mostly receivers with physical or psychical handicap or mothers with new-born baby. Based on the 
agreement between W-2 agency and the receiver, an individualized plan is developed. This plan includes the scope of labor activi-
ties, education, consultancy or especial training and conditions, which the activities shall be carried out under (e.g. the obligation 
to provide protected workshop). no limits shall apply for the social support in such case, however, the needed receives the benefits 
proportionally to his activity. 
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The participant’s benefits are reduced by us$ 5.15 per each hour of absence at the agreed activity (edu-
cation, work) without giving acceptable absence reason.87 Working participation within 40 hours per 
week at least immediately after the benefit payment starts is the universal condition of W-2. The par-
ticipation may consist in combination of work with professional training, education or consultancy. 
The system is very generous, but only for those who are active. W-2 benefits achieve the amount of 
us$628 and us$673, the fifth highest in the u.s. This amount does not include some federal benefits, 
such as eitc. in addition to that, there are the food stamps, subsidized care of children and health 
care for poor families. 
The successful W-2 scheme became an inspiration for similar programs in another u.s. states (e.g. 
new York and oregon) and also for australia, The netherlands, israel and Hessen, one of the federal 
states in Germany.   
Ad : JOBS Plus 
JoBs Plus implemented in oregon is an example of improvement of W-2 strategy. The labor activa-
tion procedure is similar to that of Wisconsin. The recipient shall be employed for a maximum of six 
months, preferably in private sector. He has to work 40 hours per week, however the employer may 
release him for 8 hours, during which the recipient shall seek for his permanent job actively. The state 
compensated to the employer the minimum wage (in 2001 it was equal to us$6.50 per hour) and all 
social contributions, minimizing so the employer’s costs for generation of the job and providing him 
cheap manpower. 88 The obligation of employer to pay us$1 for each worked hour after 30 days of the 
employment to the employee’s specific account (Individual Education Account) constitutes an improve-
ment. from this account, the employee may finance his further education and professional re-training. 
after six-month period, the client gets us$�00 approximately, which is an amount sufficient to pay 
five or six community educational trainings. The employer shall also provide a mentor to the employee 
from among his other employees, who guides him throughout the acquisition of labor skills. 
The employer is entitled to make an additional payment to the subsidized wage from his own sources 
(usually 20%). This makes more attractive the resulting outcome of active receiver. about 40% par-
ticipating employers in oregon use this option, what gives an average wage of JoBs Plus participant 
equal to us$7.41.  after the test start of JoBs Plus scheme in 1��4 (statewide it runs from 1��6), the 
number of families addict to social benefits decreased by 60% till 2001. The scheme meets also the self-
sufficiency goal for the needed since, according to the studies, up to �0% of those who left the social 
system, do not return even after 18 months of employment.8�
Ad 3: Competitiveness of Providers in New York and the Example of America Works Agency  
america Works agency is an example of successful private-public partnership in solutions for long-
term unemployment. originally, new York city subcontracted non-profit organizations only within 
87 This amount is equal to minimum wage. from october 1��� to June 2004 the agencies collected us$30.2 million on sanctions.                    
Data according to: Wisconsin Works (W-2) Program. an evaluation. Department of Workforce Development. legislative audit 
Bureau, state of Wisconsin, Madison (2005), pp. 6 – 7.  
88 The public authorities called    Adult and Family Services and Oregon Employment Department administer the scheme at oregon state 
level. at local level, there is a co-operation between private sector and government authorities. JoBs Plus co-ordinators search jobs 
for the scheme clients. if the client is a recipient of social benefits and Food Stamps, the subsidized wage is refunded to the employer 
from the costs designed for these benefits. if the client is a benefit recipient based on unemployment insurance, the subsidized wage 
is paid from the insurance.           
8� in 2001, JoBs Plus in oregon had more than 6,000 participating employers. �6% from them intend to employ the scheme clients                     
also in the future and up to 80% expressed satisfaction with business improvement after entering the JoBs Plus. according to: 
conerly–courtney (2001), pp. 1 -28.  
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the welfare reform. later on, it decided to open the market also for profit organizations, including 
the america Works. at the beginning, they were awarded with 5 contracts from 75. Thanks to the 
competition and such organizations as America Works, the number of benefit receivers in new York 
dropped by as much as nearly 800,000 between 1��6 and 2002. in new York city, the change was more 
significant: while in 1��5, the municipal Human Resources Administration reported 1.6 million receiv-
ers of social benefits, the figure was lower than 250,000 in 2003. in 1��3, the new York city Office 
of Comptroller had proved that only 17% of the social benefit recipients, who found their jobs by the 
mean of public Adult Training Program, remained with the job for longer than �0 days. 
on the other hand, the data from 1��7 show that more than �0% from among more than one thousand 
of needed placed through America Works kept working also after one year and 80% after two and half 
years.�0 such outcome not only helps the needed, but also saves public funds. Whenever the needed 
returns into the social systems after several months, the costs are double: the professional training and 
placement on the labor market were paid and, later on, social benefits again.  
The agency generates its annual profit worth us$14 million with state sources and companies employ-
ing its clients. as soon as the agency places the client successfully in labor market, sends an invoice 
for the whole procedure to the state. The costs are amazingly low – approx. us$ 5,500 per needed. 
official costs per needed in standard public schemes in new York are as high as us$2�,000 (within 
that, us$11,000 are the administrative costs, social benefits, Medicaid health care program and food 
stamps).�1 
The success of america Works consists in individual approach to the needed and detailed strategy of 
preparation and placement procedure. Most of the employed clients begin working in a trial, four-
month period. Within this period, the agency pays its client at the rate of average per-hour wage. 
Moreover, he may receive the reduced social benefits. The agency pays some expenses to the employer 
so that his per-hour costs for the created job oscillate around us$1. america Works agents visit the 
working client twice per month and try to meet his needs. if the employer is satisfied, after 4 months 
the client gets permanent job. He stops to receive the social benefit and starts to be paid by the em-
ployer. if the client stays employed for one year at least, the employer may claim for federal tax relief 
up to us$2,500.�2   
Ad 4: Individual Responsibility Contract
The Individual Responsibility Contract (irc) is an efficient tool supplementary to other labor-oriented 
schemes. The contract purpose is to define clearly the rights and obligations of both benefit recipient 
and the agency trying to help him. first of all, an agreement on way of communication with the so-
cial agent assigned to solve the problem as tutor is defined. after the interview with the handicapped 
recipient, the social agent suggests the possible solution, with regard to the nature of recipient’s inva-
lidity, in order to achieve his short- and long-term self-sufficiency. after the agreement, the recipient 
shall get the time schedule and consultant, whom he meets regularly with. The contract defines also 
the sanctions for eventual non-compliance of the obligations. Family Contract has similar spirit. its 
purpose is to ensure the due life of the family during the period, when it receives the social benefits. if 
�0 Data according to: cove (2000), p. 2 and rothman – scott (2003), p. 22.             
�1 The problem can be seen also from another point of view. if new York city pays from public sources us$8,700 per year for social                        
benefits (only) for three-member family, how much more efficient is to invest us$5,500 with the purpose to remove at least one 
of the family members from the system for more than year and help him to become self-sufficient? in any case, the cost difference 
proves that private agencies can be much more efficient (in terms of money, time and outcome) than state or municipal govern-
ments and their authorities. Data according to: cove (2000), p. 6 and rothman – scott (2003), pp. 8. – 10.
�2 according to: ibid, pp. � – 16.      
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the client has a family, then he is assigned to the corresponding entity (mostly a volunteers’ organiza-
tion), which shall ensure the consultancy and further specialized assistance and therapies (e.g. in case 
of family violence). The needed, together with the consultant, is trying to find the ways to cover the 
family budget. client also shall undertake to meet his obligations related to the family, e.g. the observ-
ance of compulsory school attendance of his children or payment of alimonies.
3.2.4 Examples of Non-cash Forms of Assistance – Experiences from the U.S. and 
Germany
in addition to reform intents aimed to reduce the government’s task in the society and programs lead-
ing to self-sufficiency, we include also examples of replacement of financial benefits with non-financial 
ones, namely with vouchers. 
There are two examples: 
. Michigan Works voucher system (u.s.)
. voucher system in aachen, Germany
Ad : Michigan Works Voucher System
There are several state social schemes within federal welfare reform, which replaced the financial pay-
ments of social benefits by voucher systems. The system is designed as to provide limited subventions 
in form not demanding a lot of paperwork, which increases the service quality, brings the competence 
among providers and, finally, gives the benefit or service recipientthe freedom of choice. The most 
important feature when making decision on introduction of the voucher system is the demand for the 
service and the private sector capacity to offer such service.  also the service diversity comes into con-
sideration. either individuals or nursing agency may ensure the care of children. The prerequisite is, for 
the providers accepting the vouchers, the compliance with quality requirements approved and checked 
by an accreditation entity depending on the service nature. obviously, such specialized providers as 
centers for dependency cure, shall meet more demanding criteria than, for example, children nurse.
The voucher system found its application, for instance, within Michigan Works scheme in Michigan, 
where each authorized recipient of assistance from public sources has his individual account for purchase 
of employment, educational and other supporting services. The amount of public funds on the account 
is based on financial sources allocated to the employment, re-qualification and support services for fam-
ily in destitution, which the client is authorized to use during the current activation phase.  each client 
shall receive vouchers covered by his account balance; the vouchers can be used for purchase of services 
authorized under the account rules. chip cards are the voucher alternative; these cards will enable the 
program client to verify the purchased services and the account balance. Michigan Works authorities give 
the clients detailed information on all service providers. Their number in the market increased signifi-
cantly after the voucher introduction and this generated competitive environment.�3
Ad . Voucher system in Aachen, Germany
The voucher system in aachen is based on an external sub-contractor. The purpose of voucher use in 
social systems is as follows:
�3 see Haberkern (2003)  .  
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▶	efficiency increase of public sources use;
▶	reduction of benefit administration paperwork demand and
▶	minimizing of the benefit abuses.
voucher systems are introduced, with strictly limited purpose and taking into account the individual 
needs of the clients, mainly of those troublesome, less adaptable and more passive. for example, this 
is also the case of the voucher system in aachen district in Germany applicable from January 1st, 
2005.94   
The vouchers in aachen constitute one form of non-financial (material) social benefit for long-term 
unemployed in economically active age in case of dependency to alcohol or drugs, who (1) are unable 
to manage the entrusted sources and/or (2) use the benefits for different purposes (abuse). They are 
designed also for situation when the financial and/or organizational requirements for the provision of 
the service for the public institution (institutions) are apparently demanding and when the choice of 
freedom among private providers of the services is given to the client.  
The vouchers in aachen social system are used also as sanctions substituting financial benefits in case 
of those who are not active and do not want to co-operate. aachen district uses an external supplier 
for this service. such voucher system is more economic and efficient. 
94 The number of examples for voucher use worldwide increases constantly, e.g. career Break voucher in the u.k., designed for fund-
ing of the respite care to nurses of heavily handicapped or older members of family in time when the receivers temporarily do not 
care of such relatives (due to holidays etc.). 
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4. Draft of Welfare Reform in Slovakia 
The foreign experiences from reform steps are inspiring for slovakia. some of them can be proposed as 
elements of consistent reform in slovakia in certain form and mutual combination. We learned about 
their mistakes and failures and, also based on our experiences while attempting for changes within the 
framework of grievous (communist) past, we propose for slovakia more integrated and crucial welfare 
reform.  
4.1 Framework Concept of Desirable State 
The objective of this reform draft is to propose consistent solutions of system distortions of social 
system (mainly those causing the “culture of dependency“) and solutions of problems of individuals 
and families in poverty and long-term unemployment in slovakia. in long term, this will enable to ap-
proximate as close as possible to the desirable state in slovakia´s social system. The main cornerstones 
of such state are the following:
▶ limited government (as defined in section 1.1) and basic level of mandatory solidarity as supplementary 
pillar to private activities and voluntary solidarity and
▶ principles of the social sphere (as defined in section 1.2).
We find as desirable final state such conditions, when the following shall apply: 
1. the individuals (except reasonable and provable exemptions) will be responsible for both their 
personal and family financial (and other) assurance;
2. the competition of private providers of social services will be unrestricted;
3. voluntary relationships and private funding on voluntary base, including the commercial insurance, 
will prevail;
4. the public pillar will become supplementary; it will guarantee only the subsistence as the basic 
living standard (according to reasonable and provable requirements) and it will be funded from the 
taxes only.    
Therefore, we think that the most systemic solution is a two pillars system of social sphere financing, 
where the private and voluntary schemes will prevail and the public pillar will be supplementary 
and mandatory, funded from taxes and individual-targeted guaranteeing the subsistence.�5  
  
Just the subsistence definition is key for targeting of welfare reform, the definition of social policy role 
and its specific measures. like we mentioned in Section ., Principles Applicable within Social Sphere, 
the guarantee of survival indispensable conditions, such as one hot meal per day, appropriate clothing 
and shelter is a standard, acceptable notion of this subsistence.�6 Therefore, the really poor people in 
slovakia’s conditions are mainly the homeless people and inhabitants of roma settlements. 
The proposed reform adheres to the principle of “individual-targeted solidarity“, targeted on such poor 
people, however, individually on those who really cannot and are unable to help themselves. 
�5 for proposals of bi-pillar system of social affairs funding, see, for example, Gonda (2001b)              or, on the example of pension system, 
Gonda-Thomay (2003). 
�6 for example, rector (2004).    
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We find the following as direct goals of the social policy (not only) in terms of slovakia: 
1. significant reduction of poverty rate of individuals and families within the society;
2. fulfillment of social protection against the poverty for those, who are really unable to take care of 
themselves and their families.
The basic milestone to achieve these goals is total (not temporary) elimination of long-term unemploy-
ment of those, who are willing to co-operate thereon. an example of significant reduction of long-term 
unemployment in praxis is the result of reform in Wisconsin (see Section 3.. for more details). 
However, for the people, who are not objectively disadvantage (e.g. without heavy health disability), 
but are poor and in long-term unemployment due to subjective reasons, only a temporary and con-
ditioned support to get out from the material need to self-sufficiency state should be provided.  The 
condition should consist in such individual’s will to develop activity (work, best of all) as the counter-
value for the government’s support. another condition is the aiming of any support towards his long-
term employment in private sector. 
so, no „helping hand“ should be given even to the people in destitution without demanding the coun-
ter-value in form of their activity.  no “end-station“ jobs in public sector should be offered them, i.e. no 
jobs without continuing in subsequent employment in private sector. Then the self-sufficiency of the 
individual and (if relevant) that of his family will become the indirect goal of social policy. 
   
However, slovakia and other countries are, more or less, significantly far from such attitude and con-
cept of the responsibility. it is not possible to get close to such desirable state in short term – to do it 
within one election period would be revolutionary, and even within one generation it is more than 
questionable. today, it requires (not only in slovakia) the transfer of large indirect “responsibility“ of 
general government to direct responsibility of citizens for their lives, including their financial situa-
tion. 
also the return to the historically proven ideas of limited government before the era of German chan-
cellor otto von Bismarck is a prerequisite thereof. and this represents the return to traditional princi-
ples of individual freedom, unlimited competition, free market and property rights. 
Therefore, the aiming of reform towards the final state means the transfer of today absolutely domi-
nant public pillar with mandatory solidarity in the individual areas of the social affairs toward a dom-
inant private pillar with individual self-sufficiency and voluntary solidarity (Diagram ). accordingly, 
the transfer of funding from “public“ sources (taxes and social contributions) to direct funding from 
private sources should occur (for more details, see Section 4.., Measures...). unlike today’s funding 
of many, and in many cases, also generous social benefits, no social contributions will be necessary 
for individual-targeted funding of “only“ subsistence (as existential standard). it was just Bismarck, 
who implemented in praxis the mandatory social insurance contributions at the end of 1�th century 
and, from that times, they constitute a significant burden of the payers and increase labor costs. This 
decreases the demand for employment and maintains relatively high unemployment rate.   
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Diagram   
Desirable Transfer of Weight from Public and Mandatory to Private and Voluntary Pillars
                                                                                Public pillar  
                                                                            Mandatory (enforced) 
                                                                                      solidarity
   
Source: authors. 
such re-orientation of perception, attitudes and money from public and mandatory to “private and 
voluntary“ means reduction of guaranteed entitlements of individuals with regard to the government. 
law in slovakia covers large and deep-rooted positive social rights. The constitution of the slovak 
republic guarantees some of them (for example, the “cost-free“ health care). in addition, much of such 
social “rights“ of the individuals (claimable at the government or other entities) are understood as ob-
vious today. “rights“ for “free“ academic education, “free“ health care�7 as well as child allowances or 
rights to protection of employees against firing are the examples. 
The core our welfare reform consists in change of concept, views and every-day application of the soli-
darity attitude. our draft welfare reform is based on the following principles of long-term perspective, 
consisting in the share transfers as follows:
▶ from public to private social security;
▶ from mandatory to voluntary principles;
▶ from relying (even partial) on government to relying on self and relaying on voluntary help of 
others only in inevitable cases; 
▶ from basic government support at central level to municipality level;
▶ from relatively universal payment of social benefits in cash to individual-targeted and benefits in-
kind forms; 
▶ from long-term and universal support for individual families to short-term (not one-off) support 
of objectivell1y disadvantaged individuals and families.
after replying such questions as “which is the idea on desirable state“ and “which are the rules for 
long-term approximation to this state“, a question with regard to the solution of problems in social af-
�7 obviously, the economists know that “there is not such thing as a free lunch“. However, the implementation of “free of charge prin-                     
ciple“, not only in social affairs, is very popular among the people (and voters). The reason why is in the illusion that it is not neces-
sary to pay for the given service or other form of assistance, since the service receiver does not pay for it directly when the service is 
used. However, the payment burden is transferred (also) to others within the society, who must pay for the relevant service by the 
mean of (higher) taxes and/or social contributions.
Government
taxes and social security contributions
Private pil-
lar
self-suffi-
ciency 
and  
voluntary  
solidarity
self-financing and voluntary payments
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fairs appears: How to achieve the desirable state? attempting to answer this question, we submit a set 
of mutually interconnected and subsequent measures.
4.2 Measures of Welfare Reform in Slovakia 
in order to (begin to) solve the long-term problems of social affairs in slovakia (described in Section 
.), we find as the most systemic and most efficient in long term such measures, which will ensure the 
backdown of government from social sphere up to the limit of individual-targeted subsistence. 
However, these measures should be supplemented with such steps, which will generate an environ-
ment favorable for replacement of significantly reduced and eliminated public benefits, e.g. by the 
mean of creation of motivating conditions (e.g. by the mean of tax relieves) for voluntary payments 
and donation in social sphere by entities and those for unlimited competitiveness of private providers 
of social services.
not only the proposals for the social expenditure individual-targeted reduction, but also the differen-
tiation of government’s support in need. The individual’s (un)willingness to co-operate is an example. 
This also means that those unemployed who are unwilling to develop any activity and, at the same 
time, are not really disadvantaged, will loose the entitlement to cash benefit and will receive only 
a non-financial support in kind in order to safeguard their subsistence. 
Therefore, we think that unquestionable direction to the desirable state requires as follows: 
1. reduce essentially the government’s role social sphere and level of enforced social solidarity to 
an extent when the public sources (in final state, from taxes only) would guarantee the individual-
targeted subsistence (included in measures of Section 4..); 
2. pressure on leaving the social system, when it pays off to be self-sufficient and to re-direct the 
activity (supply of services) from general government to private institutions (part of measures in 
Section 4..); 
3. proposals acting in synergetic manner together with reform measures (under points 1 and 2) in 
the following related areas: in education and creation of competitive environment for business, 
labor, employment and other private initiatives (see the framework in Section 4..3). 
4.2.1 Measures for Government’s Role Reduction in Social Sphere  
We recommend the performance of measures targeted to government backdown from social affairs 
up to the limit of subsistence in two steps. one of them is the reduction of entitlements to the extent 
of social and health care paid from “public“ sources. The other one is the elimination of non-systemic 
benefits and social contributions.  
such transformation of social system funding requires also simultaneous and coordinated implemen-
tation of “two face of the same coin“ – dynamic measures in public expenditure and, at the same time, 
in social contributions and taxes (summarized in Table 5), completed with non-budget measures (e.g., 
proposal for cancellation of minimum wage). The measures proposed in public benefits and expendi-
tures (as well as the rate of their importance) are mutually interconnected. together with the reduction 
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of solidarity level enforced by the government, a non-increase or decrease of government deficit is the 
secondary consequence of such measures. also in case of slovakia, this represents fiscally sustainable 
and responsible attitude to the solution of social problems persisting in long term.
This is also reason why we suggest three phases of mutually subsequent steps.�8 The 1st phase shall in-
clude the steps necessary for elimination of the most important distortions and other failures preclud-
ing such reform. During the 2nd phase, we suggest the intensification of measures from the 1st phase 
and, during the 3rd phase, such finalization of all measures, which will allow as great approximation 
to the desirable state as possible.   
st Phase of Government’s Role Reduction in Social Sphere  
More significant changes in expenditure and social contributions and, partially, also in taxes are nec-
essary at the very beginning of such (for citizens) sensitive and long-term continuous change. They 
are not only the crucial tool for “opening the door“ to (economic) freedom, but also indispensable 
prerequisite for the financial sustainability of the reform during the following period. 
since excessive contributions burden on the labor costs (see section 2.2.2 for more details) is the 
greatest barrier for the solution of (mainly the long-term) unemployment problem in slovakia, the 
introduction of our proposals starts obviously with measures related to the social contributions and 
the expenses funded on their basis (table 5).
The first step in solution of too high social contributions and the related expenses should consist in 
full transfer of the payment of the contributions to the employees, including that portion, which, in 
the time of development of this publication, is paid by the employers.�� The employers should add this 
amount to the gross wages of the employees. after that, the labor costs become equal to the gross wage. 
in this first step, the total amount of the contributions shall remain unchanged, unlike its rate and 
contributor will change. instead of the current 35.2% of the gross wage paid by the employer for each 
employee and 13.4% paid directly by the employee, after the suggested change, the latter will pay the 
whole of the contributions, at the level of nearly 36% of the gross wage (which is equal to today’s labor 
costs). This will show better the real rate of contributions burden, which decreases the employee’s net 
wage significantly. Thus, a room for reduction of contributions and their transfer to voluntary systems 
will be enabled.
it is assumed that afterwards, the advocating for reduction and cancellation of non-systemic contribu-
tions and the expenses funded thereof will be easier. Therefore, as further steps within the 1st phase, 
we suggest the stopping of payments of benefits from the guarantee insurance and cancellation of 
non-systemic contributions thereto. all what the guarantee insurance payers do, is to contribute to 
funding of obligations of some irresponsible employers. The reserve fund is similar moral hazard and 
a candidate for cancellation in slovakia. Mainly, it is its part designed for the government’s guarantee 
in case of saver’s savings defrauding in pension funds. However, it should be cancelled in its entirety 
�8 sets of measures are proposed for specific phases only within the measures aimed to reduce the task of the government in social                      
sphere, where the justification thereof (mainly with regard to high time and funding requirements at the solution of problems, 
mainly in pension and health systems) is the greatest. in the other parts (4.2.2 and 4.2.3), the measures can be mostly implemented 
and the conditions changed already in the 1st phase. 
�� for the methodology of full transfer of payment of contributions to employees in conditions of slovakia, see, for example, Gonda                    
(2001b), Gonda-Thomay (2003), sul�k (2005) an also in Ministry of finance of the slovak republic, July 2005.    
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since its remaining part – designed for deficits in 1st pillar of the pension system – should be reason-
ably funded from other sources (selling of government’s assets and savings in public expenditure).
Table 5
Measures During st Phase of Reduction of Government’ s Role a in Social Sphere in Slovakia
1. Phase (within 2 years after the reform start) 
Public expenditure b Public revenue b
Social expenditure funded from the contributions Social security contributions
transfer of contributions to employees (gross wage = labor costs)
non-payment of guarantee insurance benefits for 
compensation of employers’ obligations to their em-
ployees 
cancellation of contributions to guarantee fund 
cancellation of contributions to reserve fund and 
transfer of part of the claims on funding based ther-
eon to the state budget
non-payment of cash benefits in unemployment to 
the unemployed    
transfer of unemployment insurance contributions 
to voluntary basis and its provision by private insur-
ance companies 
non-payment of sickness benefits, benefits for care of 
family member and equalizing benefit during preg-
nancy   
transfer of sickness insurance contributions to vol-
untary basis and its provision by private insurance 
companies
non-payment of accident insurance benefits  
transfer of accident insurance contributions to vol-
untary basis and its provision by private insurance 
companies 
non-funding of costs for the related services in health 
care system (accommodation, food and transport) 
and reduction of scope of public health care (e.g. at 
medical services of first aid and non-prioritaire diag-
noses)
adequate reduction of contributions rate for public 
health insurance 
reduction of scope for paid benefits of disability in-
surance 
relevant reduction of contributions rate for disability 
insurance 
certain reduction of replacement rate in 1st pillar of 
the pension system c
reduction of  administration expenses for sia and 
health insurance companies administration (mini-
mally proportional to the reduction of their powers 
and contributions)
transfer of 2nd pillar of pension system to voluntary 
basis
Social expenditure funded from taxes Taxes
payment of partially transferred expenses from the 
system of contributions (reserve fund)
cancellation of child allowances and maternity ben-
efit reduction of  personal income tax rate to 15%  
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increasing amount of parental allowance and exten-
sion of the period of its payment for non-earned par-
ents (for children in preschool age)
cancellation of the remaining non-systemic (mainly 
one-off paid) social benefits – see the section 2.2.2  
replacement all cash benefits for unemployment and 
material need by two cash benefits and increase of 
share to benefits in kind (for more details, see Section 
4..) 
Other expenditure (except social expenditure)
reduction of current and capital transfers to business 
entities and non-compensation of direct payments to 
farmers from state budget
reduction of  corporate income tax rate to 15%
cancellation of government-paid premium for build-
ing savings 
implementation of 100-% depreciation of the invest-
ment assets within the period of its acquisition 
costs reduction within government entities (e.g. by 
the mean of reduction of the govern. employees, ex-
penses for purchase of goods and services and cancel-
lation of several entities, incl. some ministries, such as 
Ministry of construction and regional Development, 
Ministry of environment, Ministry of economy and 
Ministry of culture..).  
Notes: 
a – the measures in table 5 do not include intentionally all the measures, which might become a part of integrated 
reform of public funding (e.g. in tax area) or social affairs (e.g. the solution of social destitution problems) 
b – “public expenditure/revenue“ is a term equivalent to that of “expenditure/revenue of general government“
c – replacement rate represents the ratio of pension amount vs. wage (in %)
Source: authors
 
The contributions for sickness, accident and unemployment insurances could and, within the concept 
of responsibility transfer to the individuals, should be changed from mandatory to voluntary, using 
the possibilities for the commercial insurance products. 
More significant reduction of the scope of entitlements related to public finance is assumed within the 
1st phase already; for example of the claims on guaranteed health care (within so-called basic pack-
age). Direct funding by individuals of services, which are of non-health nature (the related services)100 
and the co-funding of, for example non-prioritaire diagnoses and costs for first-aid medical services 
are well grounded.  
from among the contributions-related systems, the greatest (mainly in financial terms) problem con-
sists the pension system, mainly the system of old-age pension security. significant increase of indi-
vidual responsibility and decrease of (today set at high level) scope of claims related to old-age pension 
system will be difficult in slovakia with regard to the population aging101 and deep deformations in-
100 This applies for the total costs for food (including the overheads), accommodation and transportation.             
101 The authors hereof do not deal specifically with solutions of problems related with assurance and funding of claims on long-term                    
care in future. However, they can be found, for instance, at http://www.novezdravotnictvo.sk/buxus/generate_page.php?page_
id=. 
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herited from the past. Therefore, this will require longer period of time. and therefore, it is distributed 
in all three phases of the reform.
However, the public old-age pension security system is, under certain conditions, financially sustain-
able in long term.  for instance, there is an assumption that in the 1st phase already could be reduced 
the guaranteed extent (replacement rate) funded from the public sources in 1st pillar. no rate reduc-
tion for public pension security is included in the 1st phase. The 2nd pillar as private capitalized saving 
may become voluntary mainly for “new“ citizens (i.e. those, for whom the 2nd pillar was implemented 
as mandatory when the pension reform started). 
The voluntariness principle is fully in accordance with the nature of pension saving, which is a form of 
“investment“ into one’s own predictable future. This corresponds to the possibility to make responsi-
ble for old-age saving the individuals; the today’s younger in full extent, mainly those, who just enter 
into the labor market. it is also applicable that the individual responsibility cannot be enforced (for 
more details, see Gonda – Thomay, 2003)102. However, today’s claims of contemporary pensioners and 
people in pre-retirement age should be guaranteed. 
These measures may, even during the 1st phase (first two years), reduce the social security contribu-
tions rates to one half (by 24 percentual point approx.) and the contributions burden on labor costs 
by nearly 14 percentage points. Therefore, after the end of 1st phase, the rates of all contributions may 
become equal to 24% of gross wage or labor costs (see charts 6 and 7). This decreases significantly 
the employment costs and increases the employment incentives for both employers and employees 
(mainly those unskilled and underskilled). This way, slovakia will achieve, as far as the contributions 
rate concerns, the level of luxemburg, which has the highest GDP per capita and one of the lowest 
unemployment rates (about 4%) among oecD countries.  
We suggest to multiply the positive effect of the significantly reduced contributions on the long-
term unemployment decrease by cancellation of minimum wage. it is the minimum wage, which 
“protects“ the less qualified labor force against its employment. Thus, already after the 1st phase com-
pletion, the space for solution of the following main problem will be created: long-term unemploy-
ment and poverty within slovakia’s conditions.  
obviously, the significantly reduced contributions and reduced competences of sia103 and health in-
surance companies related to funding of expenses based on contributions will enable the correspond-
ing decrease of sia and health insurance companies’ administration-related costs (Table 5).    
Besides contributions and expenses based thereon, also the simultaneous steps in other public ex-
penses and taxes are important for the success of welfare reform. The cancellation of non-systemic 
benefits belonging to tax-based expenses is recommendable in the 1st phase already. child allowance, 
meeting no purpose of family-targeted support, belongs to this group, since they constitute an uni-
versal increase of the family incomes. This shall apply for the one-off family allowances. as far as the 
amount concerns, child allowance is greater benefit, which we believe should be cancelled or trans-
formed into a support for poor parents. During the 1st phase, certain compensation of cancellation 
of these non-systemic benefits could be the transfer of weight to the parental allowance by the mean 
of increase of its rate up to 140% of the living minimum (this value nearly correspond to the level of 
102 for more detailed systematic proposals of the pension reform, introduced before its implementation in slovakia, see, for example,                  
the studies dated in 2002: the analyses of M.e.s.a. 10 (reptová 2002) and  nfaH (Thomay 2002).
103 sia – state social insurance agency      
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minimum wage in time of development of this publication) and extension of the payment period for 
parents with children under 5 years old. 
also the remaining non-systemic expenses, which are burdensome for the taxpayers, should be can-
celled: one-off social benefits for families, a lot of short-term aimed tools in the current social policy 
(without any pressure on self-sufficiency) and eventually other cash benefits, e.g. income support for 
those who do not need it.
also various items in public budgets, although not designed for social affairs, are similarly non-sys-
tem expenses. However, these are de facto “social assistance“ for either individuals or household and 
even for businessmen and companies. since their reduction and, optimally, cancellation will enable 
the implementation of the above-mentioned measures, their issues belong, at least marginally, to the 
reform draft. 
During the first phase, for instance, we propose to stop the subsidizing of building saving companies 
by the mean of payment of the government premium as well as the equalization of compensations 
for farmers from the national budget. it is also recommendable to minimize as much as possible the 
other current and capital transfers paid from the taxpayers’ funds to business entities (including the 
foreign investments) during the 1st phase of the reform. During these two years, we find unlikely that 
any government would be able to either struggle with eu as far as agricultural subventions cancella-
tion concerns or dare to deny stimuli to foreign investors. Despite of that, even the reduction of these 
transfers, together with, e.g., the cancellation of child allowance, might generate sufficiently large “fis-
cal cushion“ for not only dynamic reduction of social contributions, but also for non-increase of taxes, 
at simultaneous decrease (or non-increase at least) of government deficit. 
on the contrary, in case of more significant reduction or cancellation of such public expenses, certain 
taxes might be reduced even during the 1st phase. a desirable example thereof would be the reduc-
tion of the income tax (to 15% and the 100-percent depreciation of tangible investment assets at its 
purchase, see Table 5).  
The Following Phases of the Measures for Government’s Task Reduction in Social Affairs   
The implementation of similar dynamic and mutually interconnected measures during the 1st phase 
will provide firm base for the subsequent measures. During the 2nd phase (next 2 years after the 
completion of the 1st phase), the following set trends should go on continuously: reduction of con-
tributions and extent reduction for claims funded from the contributions. Therefore we suggest the 
reduction of replacement rate in 1st pillar of pension system and, within this phase, already decrease 
slightly the contributions rate for its funding, meanwhile decrease of contributions for public health 
insurance could be somehow greater as well as the related public expenditure.  
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Table 6 
Some Selected Measures During the next Phases of Reduction of Government’s Role a 
2nd Phase (within 2 years after the end of the 1st phase) 
Public expenditure b Public revenue b
Social expenditure funded from the contribu-
tions
Social contributions
replacement rate reduction (within the guaran-
teed extent) for 1st pillar of the pension system  
moderate reduction of rate for 1st pillar 
significant decrease of guaranteed scope of health 
care covered by public health insurance  
adequate reduction of contributions rate for pub-
lic health insurance 
reduction of claim scope for public disability and 
old-age insurances
transfer of contributions for disability insurance 
to state budget
significant reduction of costs in sia and health 
insurance companies and their administration
Social expenditure funded from taxes Taxes
reduction of claims on other social transfers   reduction of  personal income tax rate to 10%
payment of disability security benefits v.a.t. rate reduction to 15%
non-payment of other cash benefits and their par-
tial substitution by benefits in kind and services  
Other expenses (except social affairs) reduction of consumption tax rates to the mini-mum defined within eu
further (significant) decrease of transfers to busi-
ness entities 
reduction of corporate income tax rate to 10%
consumption reduction within general govern-
ment entities
3rd phase (long-term perspective) c
Public expenditure b Public revenue b
payment of basic health care benefits from na-
tional budget (directly or through health insur-
ance companies)
transfer of public health insurance to national 
budget
non-payment of benefits from sources previous-
ly originated by social security contributions and 
their partial transfer to state budget expenditure
transfer of old-age pension insurance to taxes (= 
end of existence of social contributions)  
cancellation of sP and significant reduction of 
health insurance companies
cancellation of transfers to business entities (based 
on agreement within or with eu)
reduction of taxes and, by the mean of imple-
mentation of common tax from all incomes and 
common consumption tax (instead of v.a.t. and 
consumption taxes) complete one tax single and 
low tax (“capitation tax“)   
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cancellation of other expenditure, which do not 
belong directly among the roles of the limited 
government  
cancellation of paternal benefit 
further consumption reduction within general 
government entities
Notes: 
a – the measures in table 6 do not include all the measures, which might become a part of integrated reform of 
public funding (e.g. in tax area) or social affairs (e.g. the solution of social destitution problems)
b – “public expenditure/revenue“ is a term equivalent to that of “expenditure/revenue of general government“
c – to be mentioned only for indicative purposes (a framework); it disregards the situation within eu, for exam-
ple the cancellation of v.a.t. and consumption taxes would not be feasible with regard to the contemporary 
conditions in eu. 
Source: authors
During the 2nd phase, transfer of disability insurance to taxes and reduction of tax rates (income taxes 
to 10%, v.a.t. to 15% and consumption taxes to the eu minimum rates) are recommendable. on the 
other hand, it will be necessary to reduce significantly the public expenses, both social and others, for 
example the subventions to companies (Table 6).
after the end of the 2nd phase, it is assumed that also other key measures will be implemented in 
order to approximate slovakia as much as possible to the final state. for this purpose, we indicate the 
aim of measures related to contributions, taxes and public expenditure. it is within this longer-term 
perspective, when the reform of contributions should be completed and the contributions should be 
cancelled. The transfer of other elements of contributions to taxes will become necessary as follows: 
transfer of contributions related to public health insurance and 1st pillar of pension system.  
since the public health insurance has de facto nature of tax104, we suggest its shift from the expenditure 
of health insurance companies to state budget. similarly (although later and at higher costs), the con-
tributions related with old-age insurance 1st pillar can be transferred to taxes. This could lead to the 
cancellation of social contributions and subsequent significant reduction of labor costs in slovakia. The 
overall effect of contributions rate reduction (contributions Misery index) and reduction of contribu-
tions burden to labor costs ratio during the reform phases are shown in Charts 6 and 7. We suggest 
to reduce the mandatory contributions to 14% during the 2nd phase already (i.e. within 4 or 5 years 
after the reform start). This is the current contributions rate of one of the most successful countries 
as far as the economy concerns during the last decades – ireland, which has very low unemployment 
rate (Chart 3). During the final phase, it would be desirable to cancel the mandatory contributions 
completely (see Charts 6 and 7). 
 
104 The main fact consists in the fact that there is no connection between the amount, which you pay and the amount you get. Most                        
of the relevant economists in slovakia as well as the Ministry of finance (for instance, see IFP MF SR, July 005) and Ministry of 
labor, social affairs and family.
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Chart 6      Chart 7   
Social Contributions Misery Index   Rate of Social Contributions Burden in Slovakia
 
Note: The rate of contributions Misery index is methodologically derived from tax Misery index, published 
regularly by forbes Magazine (chren, 2005).  
Source: authors
The crucial issue to address for the individual governments (not only) during the 3rd phase (due to 
population aging and despite the favorable reduction of expenses in this pillar) are the sources for 
the public pension system deficit. The necessary amount will depend also on the governments’ ca-
pacity and courage to reduce the replacement rate within 1st pillar of the pension system, as well as 
other (above indicated) reductions of public expenses. We assume that an amount necessary for it’s 
(re)funding will be substantially smaller than for the debt value in case of unchanged conditions as 
applicable during the development hereof. Despite any changes, there will be some deficit in the 1st 
pillar. it could be funded, aside national budget savings, also from sale of shares and assets owned by 
the government.105
With such set of mutually interconnected measures, the government may come to state, when the 
funding will be based on taxes only and guarantee the subsistence in the individual areas of the social 
affairs – for old age, handicap, disability or other life situation, and for situations of misery and real in-
ability to ensure one’s own basic life needs. low capitation tax is sufficient for funding of the existence 
minimum and further basic tasks of the limited government, while the uniform consumption tax and 
flat income tax at the approx. a level of 10% (this corresponds to the rahn curve peak, see Chart ) 
could be an important milestone to the capitation tax. 
also measures with other than financial nature should be implemented within the proposed reform; 
these measures should contribute to generation of standard environment motivating the jobs genera-
tion. These measures are specified in Sections 4.. and 4..3. 
105 We do not recommend any credit links for the funding.          
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4.2.2 Program Supporting the Self-Sufficiency 
not only the motivating conditions for donation, but also temporary and targeted measures of the 
employment policy leading toward self-sufficiency and creation of conditions for unlimited competi-
tiveness of private service providers may compensate the government’s backdown from funding and 
providing of social affairs. 
Poverty reduction throughout gradual elimination of long-term unemployment, mainly by the mean of 
economic self-sufficiency of families and individuals is the key mission for the employment policy. self-suf-
ficiency program and mainly its public and decentralized scheme of “self-sufficiency ladder“ (Diagram 4) 
is the base. The relevant program of temporary support for release from long-term unemployment should 
not only transfer the “working-is-worthwhile“ message. Work is just a part of the process. The operating 
program for unemployment services should prefer the outcome to the process. Therefore, the desirable 
message, with regard to the final state, should be as follows: “self-sufficiency works“.
 The cornerstones of public program for employment services should be based within the range of 
two poles of “tough love“ to the neighbor. on one side, the “given helping hand“ shall prevail: support 
for self-help, individual approach and freedom of choice. on the other hand, respecting the human 
nature, the system shall find strong bases in individual responsibility, fiscal thrift, strict rules and sanc-
tions. The giving of helping hand in form of government’s support (“learning the fishing“) has to 
be, in terms of time and extent, acceptable during the period, when the unemployed is seeking to 
achieve his self-sufficiency; however, with limited duration in order to avoid his return to the social 
system immediately after he leaves it. 
new program of “way to self-sufficiency“ and public and decentralized “ladder to self-sufficiency“ 
program (which is included in the “way of self-sufficiency“ – see Diagram 4) accepts that the poverty 
and capacity to leave the “addiction trap“ is not related only with the satisfaction of material needs, 
but also with the learned behavior patterns. During the 1st phase of the reform, its clear design as the 
substitute of many employment and social policy benefits and services implemented today (for more 
details, see Section ..) is the primary prerequisite for success.   
Based on the principles for social affairs (defined in Section .), mainly the following shall apply for 
the public scheme for support of self-sufficiency:
1. “work first“;
2. differentiated approach;
3. decentralization; 
4. preference of “private“ to “public“ and
5. time limits.
Ad : “Work First“ 
The search for job should be priority within all activities included in employment services, even more 
than the education and re-qualification. real employment, not the costly and inefficient trainings, 
is the best way how to acquire labor habits and skills. in order to achieve purposeful motivation, 
each labor activity must, obviously, pay off and be remunerated with money (“make-work-pay“ rule). 
Defined minimum amount of this remuneration, in case of observance of all conditions, is desirable: 
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for instance, 140% of the subsistence provided by law (this is nearly the equivalent of the minimum 
wage level as applicable in the time when this publication was developed). 
Ad : Differentiated Approach 
initiative and responsibility must pay off. non-observance of rules and passivity shall be penalized. 
The “pay-after-performance“ rule will motivate. according to this rule, the nominal amount of sup-
port and extent of services increase proportionally to the activity developed by the unemployed (trial 
job, labor in community, active search for job, education) and decrease proportionally to his passivity. 
This will mean in praxis, for instance, that the subsistence benefit will be paid to an unemployed only 
provided he complied with all the defined activities (education, search for job etc.). if the unemployed 
will not be responsible in the praxis, his benefit will be not cancelled automatically, however, it will be 
decreased proportionally to his absence on the activities. for example, if the unemployed will, during 
the phase of searching for job, participate in the activities during 10 hours instead of the defined 20 
hours, his benefit shall be reduced by half.
Ad 3: Decentralization
The best way how to solve the problems of poverty and unemployment can be found at the level of 
personal responsibility, self-help and voluntary help of others. right after this level, the most efficient 
is the participation of local administration and government in such solutions. These local entities are 
the obvious bearers of information on local situation and labor market demand. simultaneously, the 
introduction of competitiveness element into the system and seeking for the best solutions by the 
mean of context, is well desirable. Public scheme for unemployment services managed at two levels, in 
accordance with subsidiarity principle, is a desirable state. The first level would be the central govern-
ment with parliament, who are responsible for the legislative definition of basic principles and limits 
(e.g. the conditioning of financial benefit by demand for counter-value, no cash benefits to passive 
persons etc.). Municipality would be the second level – (associated) municipalities should have the 
freedom for their specific measures creation and enforcement.  
in accordance with the law, the original power of employment policy (together with the funding de-
signed within the next phase of financial decentralization) should be transferred to the municipalities, 
which would be allowed to associate during the transition period and created voluntarily the micro-
regional centers for employment services. at the same time, the municipalities will be informed on 
pre-selected centers, where they will belong to if they will not agree another alternative on voluntary 
basis during the transition period. This is aimed to the existence of micro-regions and joint (common) 
municipal entities within the system of municipalities. such structure would make more efficient the 
execution of local governments’ powers and reduce the expensive number of municipalities to 300 ap-
proximately, instead of today’s nearly 2,�00. Therefore, it would be reasonable and desirable to connect 
this step with the municipal system reform.106
Ad 4: Preference of “Private“ to “Public“  
The private employment of the social system former client is the key rule of the program. any other 
jobs related to public elements are not more than temporary, intermediate steps helping to achieve 
this goal (Diagram 4). similar principle shall apply for the provision of the services and their manage-
ment.  
106 see, for instance, sloboda (2005) and slav�k (2005).        
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it is also crucial to ensure that the municipalities would contract private supplier (non-profit entity, 
business entity etc.) for regional employment service execution based on public procurement proce-
dures (outsourcing) and avoiding the duplicate supply of the same nature by both public and private 
sectors. in another words, “any service you are able to find in the yellow pages does not belong to 
general government“. The success prerequisite is the openness for all types of entities (including those 
aimed to profit making) and no deformation of their free competition. only in case of no offers from 
regional private entities, the (associated) municipalities should perform this activity as efficiently as 
possible, in form of joint centers.     
Ad 5: Time Limits
There must be limits for giving the helping hand. The unemployed must realize that there is time limit 
for the provided financial support and services. During this time, they have all conditions for search 
of job and to become self-sufficient. time limits preclude the system abuse by “professional receivers“. 
The well-proven time limit for benefit and service lifetime receipt is 5 years, but not longer than 2 years 
continuously. 107 When the 5-year limit is over, all receivers able to work should receive only the help in 
kind108 from public sources, or charity help from private sector or local administration (e.g. emergency 
accommodation of homeless persons). This measure should apply always for passive receivers, with 
the obvious exception of really disadvantaged groups (e.g. disabilitypped) unemployed persons.    
We recommend to connect the public program for employment services to the following measures: 
▶ benefits conditioned with (almost) whole-day activity;
▶ individual self-sufficiency plan (iPs) and the support tools; 
▶ community partnerships;
▶ client-aimed approach.
Whole-Day Activity
 
labor activity, education or active search for job should, as much as possible, replace the normal la-
bor day dropout. The habits related to eight-hour labor day disappear as much as the unemployment 
period continues. This happens quickly and the room for asocial habits appears. The unemployed 
individual’s mandatory participation on activation-related obligations should take 30 hours per week 
at least.  The amount of his reward for labor activity (e.g. the activation benefit replacing the activa-
tion contribution) and compliance with the agreed obligations should be derived from the duration of 
participation in the scheme (“pay-after-performance“ rule). in case of job taking 30 hours per week, 
the reward should exceed slightly the subsistence, however, it should increase proportionally with the 
time dedicated to the activation (not more than up to 140% of the subsistence).
Individual Self-Sufficiency Plan
 The individual self-sufficiency Plan (iPs) is basically the contract on individual’s responsibility made 
between the unemployed and his family on one side and the provider of employment services on the 
other side.  The individual action plan developed in accordance with §43( 6) of the applicable act no. 
5/2004 on employment services for the unemployed is different not only due to its lesser strictness of 
right and obligations of both parties, but iPs will be aimed not only to improve the prerequisites for 
107 in order to avoid the system abuse, the measure will require creation of nationwide digital register of job applicants, which will                     
include the applicant’s progress and type of support and services from public sources he receives.   
108 for example, in form of debit card designed only for purchase of food or living costs, or in form of specific-purpose vouchers.                     
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introduction of the individual into the labor market, but also to assess in integrated form the obstacles 
for his self-sufficiency and agree the procedure of their elimination, including the requirement of re-
sponsible behavior of the unemployed also in other areas than searching for job. The contract should 
be prepared during the meetings with personal consultant (see hereunder the specification of “client’s 
procedure“ tool), where the both parties will attempt to identify the key obstacles (insufficient skill, 
addiction to alcohol etc.) precluding the employment. They shall agree a set of measures and tasks 
with deadlines (education, treatment, labor for community, trial job etc.). The compliance with them 
shall be a prerequisite of any support and services from public sources except food and charity assist-
ance. The contract shall establish the rights and obligations of the unemployed (observance of com-
pulsory school assistance, payment of debts etc.), their checking and the eventual sanctions in case of 
non-observance of the agreed plan.
implementation of these measures and observance of the above-mentioned rules assume the commu-
nity partnerships and client-aimed approach. 
 
Community Partnerships 
 lack of communication and partnership between general government and civic society at the com-
munity level causes no use of social capital, which the heterogeneous parts of civic society might utilize 
in social affairs. There is also a developing network of civic associations, foundations, non-investment 
funds, non-profit organizations and churches providing wide range of supplementary services carried 
out at personal and professional level, which might help the unemployed and his family significantly 
during the critical phases. each front-line officer of micro-regional center or supplier’s entity should 
have a list of entities within the community, which may provide the specific support service (con-
sultancy, treatment of addiction, spiritual help, alternative free-time activities of children etc.) to the 
unemployed. The key representatives of the partners (regional and local administration, civic associa-
tions, nGos, churches, local development agencies, key employers, businessmen etc.) should meet on 
regular basis in order to exchange information and create short- and long-term strategies in order to 
reduce the regional unemployment.
Client-Aimed Approach 
either micro-regional centers of private providers of employment services should apply the client-
aimed approach with regard to the unemployed, with strict targeting to the goal (self-sufficiency) 
instead of vague administrative procedure. if necessary, also the introduction of uniform contact spots 
system would be a solution (“one-stop office“) as well as the transformation of current administrative 
capacities to the network of personal consultants.  Personal consultants with professional qualification 
for social affairs would serve not only as consultants at iPs development and assistance for support 
services. They should personally manage and control the assigned groups of unemployed on the way 
toward their self-sufficiency.  Therefore, they should work as Hr agents engaged in the procedure of 
search and mediating of jobs for the clients. Within the procedure of employment service scheme, 
the personal consultants play key role, from the first instruction throughout the development of indi-
vidual plans to its monitoring (see Diagram 3).    
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Diagram 3 
Simplified Process Scheme for Decentralized Program of Employment Services
 
Source: authors 
Based on the application of above-mentioned principles and their combination with the measures, we 
are able to design the framework of desirable scheme for employment services, shown in Diagram 4 and 
based on positive experiences of similar schemes, for example, in Wisconsin of oregon (see Section 3.). 
“Way to Self-Sufficiency“ Scheme  
The proposed scheme (see in Diagram 4) consists of five levels (various, mutually interconnected ap-
proaches):
▶ first (bottom) level: passivity. if the client will not co-operate in order to release from the passivity, he will 
loose the claim on financial support, staying only with subsistence benefits in kind; 
▶ three levels of labor activation within the decentralized scheme called “ladder to self-sufficiency“ (Diagram 4);
▶ fifth (top) level is the self-sufficiency (job in private sector or business), without claim on public sources10�.
The labor activity within “ladder to self-sufficiency“ should consist of three degrees as follows:  labor 
for community (in favor of local administrations, civic associations, churches etc.) made by receivers 
without labor habits, subsidized trial jobs in order to acquire the basic labor skills and, finally, non-
subsidized job in private sector. Both up- and downward mobility is usual between the individual 
phases of this virtual ladder: from the initial unemployment to the final self-sufficiency.  an unem-
ployed person may enter the process in any phase. for instance, if he is sufficiently skilled and lost the 
job just recently, either micro-regional center or provider may mediate him directly a non-subsidized 
job or trial job in order to make him leave the system as soon as possible. on the contrary, the transi-
tion phase of search for job and labor for community are designed for troublesome clients without 
basic labor habits and experience. regardless the phase he enters, each client shall agree his iPs with 
10� an exception could be given to those individuals and families, whose low job- or business-based income during the critical period                    
of creation of financial independence is not sufficient to keep the self-sufficiency. Based on individual assessment of oP, there 
should be available two services in form of vouchers funded from public sources: co-financing of care of children (in kindergar-
tens and private nursing agencies) for these clients who really cannot care of children since they are working and co-financing 
of transportation in cases when the travel costs would not allow them to keep the employment. Based on the testing of necessity, 
these two services should be provided not longer than one year, but not shorter than for the period allowing the client saving 
funds enough to pay for these services or eventually ensure them with the help of larger family or community.
Unemployment/ 
idleness
visit to micro-
regional center/ 
provider according 
to domicile
First contact
consultation with 
assigned consult-
ant 
Job Seeking with  
consultant:
– preparation of IPS
– training
– services of com-
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Self-sufficiency:
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Business
Trial Job:
Private sector job
Preparation  
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the personal consultant. at the same time, iPs is a prerequisite for receiving of support and services 
paid from public sources. 
cash benefits (living minimum and activation benefit or wage compensation up to 140% of the living 
minimum) should not be paid from the public scheme directly to the unemployed. in order to avoid 
their abuse in phase of search for job, this might be carried out by the mean of specific receiver110. This 
could be the micro-regional center or the provider in case of search-for-job phase and the employing 
entity in case of labor for the community. During the trial-job phase, the employer should receive a 
benefit from public funds for the salary achieving approximately 140% of the living minimum enacted 
by law. However, the employer should pay the basic portion thereof. He might increase this wage ac-
cording to his discretion.
The temporary assurance of available income at the level of existential and life minimum by the mean 
of cash benefits (search for job, labor for community) or participation at wage costs from public sources 
(trial job) shall serve solely for sharing the costs during the critical period, without any legal claim 
thereon. Local governments should make the decisions on extent and amount of the support and 
services within the associated municipalities and the personal consultants in either micro-regional 
center or provider on their payment (and check of use). 
Then we suggest to replace all non-system and non-transparent benefits (see Section ...) by the 
following two financial benefits as form of temporary support from public sources: monthly benefit of 
living minimum expressed in percentage (less than 100%) thereof (for the phase of search for job and 
labor for community) and activation benefit (for community job only), which should motivate by com-
pensating the difference between living minimum and the limit for job-based income (140% of living 
minimum). The pay-after performance rule validity is recommendable for the payment of both these 
benefits. 111  
We recommend to implement any other forms of support in non-cash manner, e.g. with voucher sys-
tem. vouchers for defined purpose may increase the purposefulness, efficiency and effect of handling 
with taxpayers’ funds, minimize the social benefits abuse and the related usury. all this increases the 
freedom of choice for the affected individuals. 
We would like to mention, from among the possible forms of vouchers in municipalities, the voucher 
for payment of placement of child in kindergarten or nursing agencies to those families and mothers, 
who participate in the activation scheme. also sharing of the costs related with transportation could 
be made this way. We also suggest to apply the food support from public sources, otherwise designed 
as the only mean of public help to passive unemployed unwilling to develop activities, also during the 
phase of search for job. regardless their activity degree, the unemployed have the freedom of choice 
related to additional services provided by the community partnership on the base of recommenda-
tions of personal consultant. 
110 The institute of specific receiver ensures the responsible handling with the income of client included in public scheme. for ex-                   
ample, the specific receiver could, using the received benefit (benefits), after the consultation with oP, pay such payables and 
receivables of problematic client as alimonies, house rent or contributions to educational account, depending on obligations 
agreed in iPs.
111 This means, that the subsistence benefit shall be paid in full extent to the unemployed only in case of observance of all defined ac-                       
tivities – education, job searching, iPs preparation, observance of children’s compulsory school attendance etc. if the unemployed 
will not meet his obligations duly, his benefit will not be withdrawn automatically, but it will be reduced proportionally to his 
non-observance. for example, if the unemployed participates in job searching activities during the phase of job search 10 hours 
instead of the defined 20 hours, his benefit will be reduced by one half.       
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Legend: a The associated municipalities subsidize the proportional part of wage costs up to 140% at least of the 
legally enacted subsistence, approximately at the level of today’s minimum wage. b symbolic level of non-finan-
cial participation of public funding by the mean of vouchers with defined purpose; participation on daily child 
care and transportation in accordance with individual assessment of oP in case of standard job and business is 
exceptional only (see footnote 113). c This consists in debit card or voucher with defined purpose for the food 
subvention. d Personal participation in especially designed rooms of micro-regional centers or providers and 
with assistance of personal consultant. e individual self-sufficiency plan. f Micro-regional center for employ-
ment services created as joint office of municipalities. g Provider of employment services based on public pro-
curement procedures (non-profit organization, civic association, profit-aimed company etc.). 
4.2.3. Measures Completing and Extending the Reform Draft
The execution of proposed reform measures is interconnected and completed with measures in some 
other sectors of the economy and politics. in relation with reforms in social sphere, this is mainly the 
following:
. labor market flexibility 
. education 
 
Ad : Labor Market Flexibility   
although the labor-related law in slovakia is more flexible than that of most eu countries, however, a 
lot of administrative obstacles still preclude the higher flexibility of the labor market. 
increase of the labor market flexibility, mainly the elimination of excessive protection of employees 
against job termination and creation of space for more flexible forms of employment should contrib-
ute to the solution of the long-term unemployment. legislative provisions related to trade unions and 
the existence of minimum wage are examples thereof (for more details, see Section ...). 
administrative obstacles and extensions in the employment procedure could be reduced – by the mean of 
electronic sending of forms (e-government), “one-stop“ offices etc. The relations between employees and 
their employers should be based merely on bilaterally voluntary contracts and collective negotiation. 
However, the most important issue will be the resistance to the pressure of eu bodies and other coun-
tries made in favor of implementation of less flexible law, increased powers for trade unions and new 
social (over-)rights and “privileges“.  Good example is the recent amendment of ec Directive on some 
aspects of work time organization, which has to implement the work time to 48 hours weekly, limita-
tion of extra times and strengthening
Ad : Education 
More than half of long-term unemployed citizens has only basic education degree and lacks the ba-
sic labor habits. This generates hard obstacle for their employment. This hazard shall be eliminated, 
first of all with regard to the prevention of young generation’s asocial behavior. Therefore, within the 
system of education policy, it is necessary to increase the compulsory school attendance period up to 
12 years (this gives higher probability of secondary education completion), extend the zero degree in-
stitute with emphasis to acquire the basic communication skills of the children coming from socially 
less developed environments. 
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all forms of education related to the search for job shall be outsourced on the base of inquiries, op-
timally directly at the potential employer. Pilot schemes for long-term unemployed aiming to the 
completion of basic or secondary education created in non-profit sector and in co-operation with 
municipalities, schools and the government constitute positive trends.
 
The potential tool for funding the supplementary education of long-term unemployed without charg-
ing the public funds consists in creation of “individual educational account“. The employer should pay 
the agreed percentage of wage or activation benefit to the participant in public scheme for employment 
service. The money on the individual account will revalue and the activated person will be allowed to 
pay only trainings (language, re-qualification etc.) at private providers chosen by his own for himself 
or somebody of his closest family (wife or children under his care). The tool of “individual educational 
account“ is based on the “outplacement“ rule, which is used successfully in Hr management of private 
companies at individual or collective terminating of job contracts.
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Summary
This draft of welfare reform includes the concept of crucial change of social system in slovakia in both 
long- and short-term perspectives. We are not interested in partial solutions only or in views to certain 
groups of population within the society. This is in accordance with Henry Hazlitt’s recommendation 
stating that “the art of economics consists in the research of not only immediate, but also long-term con-
sequences of any act or measure and in the monitoring of this impact not only on one group, but also for 
all the remaining groups of the society” (Hazlitt, �1�46�� 2005).   
first of all, our long-term “view behind the corner“ to the desirable final status shows a strict alter-
native to more or less deformed attitudes of the government towards social sphere as well as to the 
majority understanding of government roles within social policy in theory and praxis. We find as 
desirable the status when, first of all, the individuals will be responsible for their financial affairs and 
the financial affairs of their families. at the same time, private and voluntary schemes of financing, 
providing of services and voluntary solidarity will become absolutely dominant (see Section 4. for 
more details). The public pillar as their supplement will be the secondary funding based on taxes 
and targeting individually the guaranteed subsistence. However, nobody will have the (automatic) 
entitlement to the cash benefit in advance.  
Practical basis of the goal state consists in the identification of the crucial distortions within social 
sphere; these distortions shall be resolved in essential manner. We find as such distortions mainly 
excessively large, generous and widely conceived share of the social solidarity guaranteed by the 
government, high social contributions and other mandatory social-affairs related payments, cash 
benefits and positive social rights guaranteed in advance, universally applicable and without request 
for counter-value.
The measures included in the reform are grouped and proposed in accordance with several methodo-
logical criteria.  one of them is the simultaneous solution of public income and public expenditure. 
This criterion is aimed toward the fiscal sustainability of the reform. The second essential criterion is 
the mutual sequence of the three phases of the individual measures. This aims, at substantial and vig-
orous reform, toward the reform feasibility, acceptance and also fiscal sustainability. This emphasizes 
not only the clear idea related to the goal status and the vigor of the measures, but also their realism 
and practical feasibility.
The first phase is the key period of the reform; it should take two years since the reform start. We rec-
ommend vigorous withdrawal of the government from the social affairs during this phase already.  
However, this withdrawal should be balanced with motivating conditions for voluntary solidarity, 
competition of private providers and changed policy (specific scheme) for way to self-sufficiency 
(see Scheme 4 in Section 4..). training programs should serve as the complementary element. 
We expect that, after the end of the first phase, the substantial decrease of social contributions (to 24% 
of gross wage or labor costs) and the appropriate reduction of the rate of mandatory social solidar-
ity, together with the decreasing of personal and corporate income tax (with simultaneous reduction 
of, for instance, subsidies) and in synergy with the minimum wage abolition, shall contribute to 
significant reduction of the long-term unemployment. for those remaining in the social system, 
temporary and decentralized schemes shall be provided in order to help them get out from the welfare 
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system and introduce them into the labor market, with final perspective of employment or entrepre-
neurship within private sector.
The implementation of these and also another reform measures is the substantial solution; in case of 
implementation of the third (long-term) phase, it eliminates the distortions within the social system 
in slovakia, too. However, it meets the financial, societal and other criteria of sustainability. it has no 
liquidating effects on people in destitution. in accordance with the above-mentioned, the vacant place 
after the government backdown from the area of funding and providing of services shall be occupied 
due to creation of conditions for individual self-sufficiency, private providers of social services and 
voluntary solidarity. although vigorous in current conditions (also for slovakia), such welfare reform 
is also feasible in praxis. it is featured by the concept of fundamentally and substantially changed goal 
status and set of vigorous, however gradually (by phases) implemented measures, which allows getting 
as close as possible to the goal. 
The idea of our conceptual proposals was to interconnect the individual steps in as much integrated 
manner as possible. also with regard to the social policy goal as we understand it (i.e. more strictly 
than it is habitual for both professional and common public), we intentionally did not deal with vari-
ous areas within social and health affairs (e.g. social services, long-term care, pension scheme etc.). 
Despite this, we are convinced that our draft of social reform concept is sufficiently completed, sys-
tematic and efficient with regard to the solution of the main problems within social affairs, which are 
connected with the long-term unemployment and poverty in slovakia.
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Annex
Diagram 5
Definition of General Government in Slovakia (004)
Legend: ŠfrB – state fund for Housing Development, ŠflJZ – state fund for liquidation of nuclear Power 
equipment and Handling with spent fuel and radioactive Waste, fnM – national Property fund, sPf – slovak 
estate fund, sko, a.s. – slovenská konsolidačná , a.s., Mf sr – Ministry of finance of the slovak republic, ŠÚ 
sr – statistic office of the slovak republic
Note: regional and local governments include the institutions of territorial self-government. local govern-
ments are included in the national budget. 
Source: Gonda (2004b), Mf sr, ŠÚ sr.
Chart 8 
Comparison of Average Dwelling Space Between the U.S. and European “welfare states“
Source: Bergstrom-Gidehag (2004), conversion to m2 and diagram adjustment by authors.
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Chart 9
Comparison of Unemployment Rates in OECD
Source: oecD (2005), diagram by authors
Chart 0
Comparison of Tax Wedge in OECD (004)
Source: oecD (2004b). 
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Table 7 
Comparison of long-term unemployment share on total unemployment in OECD (004)
countries with relatively lower share of 
long-term unemployment
Countries with relatively lower share of 
long-term unemployment
country (total unem-
ployment in %) 
share of long-term 
unemployment
country (total unemploy-
ment in %) 
share of long-
term unemploy-
ment
australia              (5.4%) 20.7% Belgium                   (12.0%) 4�.6%
austria                 (5.0%) 24.5% czech republic         (8.3%) 51.8%
canada                (7.2%) �.5% france                      (10.1%) 41.6%
Denmark             (5.7%) 22.6% Germany                    (�.�%) 51.8%
iceland                 (4.4%) 11.2% Greece                      (10.2%) 54.7%
korea                   (3.5%) 1.1% Hungary                     (6.2%) 45.1%
luxemburg          (2.8%) 22.6% Poland                      (1�.0%) 47.�%
Mexico                 (3.0%) 1.1% Portugal                     (6.7%) 43.2%
new Zealand       (3.�%) 11.7% slovakia                   (18.1%) 60.6%
norway                (4.5%) �.2% turkey                      (10.3%) 3�.2%
sweden                (6.6%) 18.�% italy                            (8.1%) 4�.7%
u.k.                      (4.7%) 21.4% spain                        (11.0%) 37.7%
usa                      (5.5%) 12.7% ireland                        (4.4%) 34.3%
finland                 (8.8%) 23.4% Japan                          (4.7%) 33.7%
The netherlands (5.0%) 32.5% switzerland                (4.2%) 33.5%
Source: oecD (2005)
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Abbreviations 
afDc – aid to families with Dependent children
aPtP – labor market active policy
DWD – Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development
eitc – earned income tax credit
eu – european union   
fnM – national Property fund
GDP – gross domestic product
GnP – gross national product
iPs – individual self-sufficiency Plan
irc – individual responsibility contract 
ki – M.r. Štefánik conservative institute
Mf sr – Ministry of finance of the slovak republic
MPsvar sr – Ministry of labor, social affairs and family of the slovak republic
oecD – organization for economic co-operation and Development
oP – personal consultant
PrWora – Personal responsibility and Work opportunity reconciliation act
sko, a.s. – slovenská konsolidačná , a.s.
sia – social insurance agency
sr – slovak republic
ŠflJZ – state fund for liquidation of nuclear Power equipment and Handling with spent fuel and 
radioactive Waste
ŠfrB – state fund of Housing Development
ŠÚ sr  - statistic office of the slovak republic
tanf – temporary assistance to needy families
u.s. – united states of america
v.a.t. – value added tax
W-2 – Wisconsin Works
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